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Non-Thesis (ML597) Project
Health care encompasses a broad. complicated web of political. economic and cultural

ideology. values and systems, whiclr have haunted every U.S. presider-rt serving over the last

century. While rnany presidents have tried, f'ew have succeeded in n-raking

sr-rch su,eeping

change as President Barack Obamawhen, on March 23,2010. historic retilrm wils cnacted,,vith

tlre passing ol rhe Pulicnl Prolection und A.f/itrtluhla Cure
runder eacli president's leadership is reviewed.

Acl. A history ol'broad refbrnr cftbrts

fbllowed by an explora'rtion into detrnitior-rs

arrd

requirements of presidential leadership. Lessons fbr refbrrr as developed b", Blr-rrlerrthal and

Morone (2009) are outlined and President Obama's eflbrts since taking olllce are appliecl r,vithin
this fiarnework. Evaluating President Obarna within this lens offers an opportunity to explore
this new fiamework, to show connections between presidential leadership ancl his role
efJbrts, and provides lessons fbr any leader striving to create change.
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AT THE HEART OF I_IEAL,fI-I CARE ITEFOI{N4: I,EADERSHIP LESSONS IIROM
PRESIDENT ORAMA
lntroductiort
On March 23,2010, historic health care insurance retornr passed in the Llnited States.
Despite the fact that the I.J.S. spends the most on health care atrd arguably exports the most
health-care related ideas and technology of auy countrf irr the r.vorld, 47 million resideuts still
Iack health insr-rrance and the U.S. remains the only incJustrializecl nation irr the world that does
not have national health insnrance (NHI) (Kaiser Family l]oundation. 20l0; Klein. 2003; L].S.
Census

Bureau.2A0T. Yet, it is rnore than.just

tl-re

personal hcalth of residents that is suflbring.

I-lealth care expenditLrres in the Llnited States slrrpasscd $2.3 trillion in 2008. l-he
average resident spent $7,681 while health care accor-rnted

Donrestic Product (GDP)

-

the higlrest

olall

fbr

16.2%, of the nation's Gross

indr-rstrializecl countrics (Health Affairs.2010;

Kaiser Family Foundation, ?010; LJ.S. Departnrent olHealth ancl Ilurnan Services.20l0). Total
health care expenditLlres grew at an annual rate o1-4.21 percent in 2008,
years. yet

er

slolver rate than recent

still or,rtpaced intlation and the growth in rrational income (l(aiser Iratlily Foundation,

2010). At the same time, increases in spending continuc to outpace growth
available to pay fbr

ir-r

the resources

it (Health Af-fairs. 2008).

During his campaign fbr president. Barack Obarla mzrde health care refbrnr a major part
of his platform. Just one year after taking otfice as the ,+4tl' l'resiclent of the L]nited States.
President Obama saw his campaign prornise come to lif'e when he signed the Patient Proteclion
und A.ff-ortlahle Cure

Acl inlo law. Many presidents befbre hirn

positions across the political spectrum

-

-representing

parties and

have attempted to tackle health care refbrm, but f-ew

have succeeded in accomplishing such sweeping change. Like his predecessors, Obama

1
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cliscovered that a promise on the campaigrr trail nreans sonretliing conrpletely'difJ'erent once in

office- and he firccd the same arglrments. challenges. olrstaclcs aud dcbates of those belirrc him.
Yet. unlike his predecessors. he managed to generarte enor.rgh sr-rpport to see his vision become

reality. Afier a century of failed attempts. what was it about this timc. place or circumstance that
allowed refbrm to come to fruition?
Flealth care encompasses a broad. complicated web of political. economic and cr"rltural

ideology, values and systems that must be r"rnderstood to tn-rly appreciate the rlagnituc'le ol'the
recent passing. Regardless of political belief-. reviewing recent health care

relbrrl within the

conflnes of history and the context of presidential leadership ofl-ers lcssor-rs lbr leaders.

partictrlarly those attempting to implernent change.
This stLrdy will review the history of health care refbrnr in the [Jnited Statcs b1, first
looking at relbnn eflorts under past presidential leadership. cxploring the cletjnition arrd
requirements of presidential leadership. and review,ing the cvents that tooh placc in hcalth care

refbnn since Presiclent Obarna took otflce. Next. eight lessorrs lbr

leacle rs attcrtrptin-e

liealth care

refbnn as created by Blumenthal and Morone (2009) are outlined to provide'n franrervork within
whicl-r to review President Obama's leadership in health care

retbrrr. An in-dcpth content

analysis that inclr-rded historically-based books. peer-reviewed and empirically'-basecl.f ournals,

pnblic opinion polls and rnedia reports fiom the past year provides the opportunity' to then

identity general themes and key learning, as w'ell as additiorrerl irnplications tbr leaders.
Achieving landmark refbrm took a particular type of leadership. and insights gained

tiorl

reviewing President Obama's leadership in health care refbrm will provc beneflcial fbr his
remaining time in ofIce, fbr future administrations attempting reform. or any leader striving to
create clrange.

Obanra's I-lealth f'arc
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Literatr-rre Review

The old saying "histoly repeats itsclf"holds true in the fate of health care retbrni. The
same issues. concerns. arglulrents ancl stories have appeared and reappearred tirne atrd tinre again

throtrglrout tlte history o[-refbrm etlbrts. Political historians refbr to this as periot{it'it1t

-

the

cycles and eras of Anterican politics (Blun-renthal & Morone, 2009). In order to understand the

periodicity in health care. I will frrst analyze the history of health care refbrrn in the United
States. I will sumrnarize past presidential eftorts, identify the r-rnderlining issues and oLrtside
factors. highlight key'stakeholders and oLrtline suggested theories to understand how the LJ.S.

arrived at its current starte. Next, I will explore the notion of presidential leaclership. inclLrdirrg
suggested deflnitions. reqr-rirerlents and trends. Finally, I

will observe Obama's health care

platfbrm and rcview tltc'events thart took place since Obama arrived in ofTlce and led to the
eventttal pirssir-rg ol'tlre

l)uliutl Protection untl Af/ircluble Cure Act.
tr4''hul i.s' the

Hi.rtory o/'Heulth Cure Re/brm E//brts'?

Up until the rccctrt passirrg of
healtl-r insureruce. atrd the U.S.

Nfll.

l"rezrlth care

insurance refbrm^47

nillion people lircl<ed

still remains the only industrialized nation in the world u'ithout

Many explanettiotrs. systems and theories exist which attempt to illustrate how,the Ll.S.

arrived at its current state. but it is flrst important to review previous refbnn attempts that have
been made which have shaped and deflned the industry. Given my emphasis on presidential

leadership. I

will fbcus on the broad etlbrts that took place dr-rring

each U.S. President's tenure

beginning with the early It)00s.
Presidentiul E.//orts
More than a century of popr-rlar efTorts to achieve national health care have taken place.

with the tlrst major push happening around the same time

as the campaign

fbr president in

191 2

3
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(Birn, Brown. Fee. & Lear.2003; Kaiscr l-'amily'I--oundation.2009). FIavin-u lost the Republican
Party nomination to incumberrt Presicient l-lowarcl Tati. Theodore Roosevelt broke fiom the party
to

join the progressive rnovement

ancl hccanre the party's presidential nonrinee. The Progressive

Party turned to Roosevelt "as a vehicle fbr movirrg the LI.S. toward the hoped-tbr social.justice

long ignored by conveutional politicians'' (Birn et aI..2003. para.2). They endorsed social
insurance as part of their platfbrm. of wlrich rratiorral healtlr insurance was included (Birn et al..

2003; Kaiser Family Foundation.2009). The split of voters between fati and Roosevelt
r-rltimately resulted in the election of Denrocratic nominee Woodrow Wilson, but it sparked the

Progressive and Socialist Parties to continue their etlbrts by carnpaigning at the city and state
levels. and championing issues through organizations ("Wilson- a portrait." ?001).
For exarlple. one organization that existed during Wilson's tenure was the Arnerican

Association fbr Labor Legislation (AAL-L). The organization led state-by-state campaigns fbr
workmen's compensation" and in 1915 created a model and subsequent campaigns to promote
erlployment-based sickness insurance (lJirn et al." 2003). The plan was meant to cover missed
time at work due to illness or injLrry verslrs actuerlly paying fbr the costs of care, to which the

AALL received initial supporl. They argr-red that the market '"failed to protect the health of the
worktorce and American industrial productivity was strfl-ering" (Gorsky,2070, para. 5).
However, in 1917 the country enterecl into Worlcl War I, which shified the country's fbcr,rs away

fiom such dornestic needs. At the

sarrre time, war provided opponents o1'social security

insurance with ammunition in the fbrm of propaganda. Statutory sickness insurance had

originated in Germany in 1883. with the primary goal of enhancing efllciency of the workfbrce
and in part to curb socialism. Opponents, therefbre, argued that its roots stemmed

fiom

communist ideology and was therefbre. un-American (Gordon,2003; Gorsky,20l0). Despite

Olrarra's ljearlth Care Relbrru
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the best of intentions. the f-ears instilled in the Artrerican peoplc silerrced the conversation and
hope fbr refbrm at any level was lost for sonre tinte.
Con-rpr-rlsory health insurance disclrssions did not rcsr"rrfhce again r-rntil the

rlicldle of the

1930s. when President Franklin D. Roosevelt led the courrtry through The Great Depression. He
created the Comrlittee on Economic Secr-rrity to address olcJ age irnd unemployment issues, as

well as medical care and insurance (Kaiser Farnily FoLrnclation.200c)). IIe initially backed
rrational health insurance as part of The.rVgrr Deul proposals but there was once again strong

opposition. Organized medicine and its allies includin-u business. labor and insurance groLlps
opposed such an inclusion and invariably Lrsed their resoLlrces to lobby against it (Birn et al..

2003), Opponents believed
reqr-rired to

tl-rat under an

N[]l

rnodel "plrvsicians wolrld lose their autonomy,be

work in group practice models. or bc paid by' salary or capitatecl nrethods" (Kaiser

Family For-rndation, 7009, p. 2). ln addition. rnedical intere st groups opposing health insurance
ref-erred to

it as socialized medicine.

entire Social Security Act

tr-r

debate again in his next term

Prc'siclerrt l{ooser,elt

advance national health

cJic'l

not want to risk the passage olthe

relirrrl and vowed to take up the health

(Gorsky.20l0). Howevcr. fbllowirrg

care

the Social Security Act,

Congress was hesitant to undertake additional governrlerrt cxpansion. World War

II

began and

shified priorities, and Roosevelt passed away betbre he w'as able to see health care refbrm on the
agenda again (Kaiser Family Foundation. 2009).

Labor groups, Inedical associations and Congress cor-rtinued to debate health insurance
over the next decade. During World War II (1939-1915), employers began offering health
benefits to attract employees and with the economy on the upswing, beneflts became a chip at
the bargaining table to be negotiated between employers and r-rnions (Smith, 1993). Just nine

months into his tbufih term, President Roosevelt passed away and Harry S.Truman suddenly

Olrarna's Ilcalth Citrc

tbtrnd himsell'at the helnr. which he rrerintained

ltclirrrl

(r

fl'orl 1945-1t)53 (Blttmerrthal & Morone.2009:

Wlritehouse.gov. 2010). Followin-{ Roosevelt's lead and as perrt ot'his Frrir Daul agetrclit.
President 'fruntan asked Congress to pass a national health progranr consisting of flve rcfbnls.

"hospital construction. expanded maternal and child health services. a broad program olrnedicarl
education and research, national health insurance (presented sirnply as "prepayment of r-nedical
costs") and disability insurance to protect workers fiom sickness and injury" (Blun"renthal &
Morone" 2009. p. 70).
Once again. opposition prevailed. Organizations such as the American Medical

Association (AMA). the voice of physicians, instilled f-ear in citizens that refbrm would create
socializc'd medicine. additional governmental control and reiterated that the concept of national
health insurancc stemnled fl'orn commllnist roots. Trttman's efforts were undercut as the
ltepLrblicaus took over Congress. and he was not able to break thror-rgh the f-ear. politics and
bLrre'etrcracy that hacl previously l-rar-rnted refbrm ef1brts. War" unemployment and segt'egatiort

took priority or,'er

pr-rrsr"ring

corlpulsory health instrrance as issues had so oftcn in

tl"re past

(Kaiser

Fanrily' For-rndation. 2009).
President Dwight E,isenhowercame to oftlce in 1953. "lke". as he was afl-ectionately'
callec{. believed that private mechanisms cor-rld solve the public's health problerns and

in

sent a special message to Congress that encollraged them to consider that "good health is

1955 he
a

proper national concern" (Eisenhower, 1955, para.l). "The E,isenhower health policy wor-tld keep

groping fbr ways to strengthen private health insurance and bolster local efTbrts to improve
access to health care- always

with a wary eye on the budget" (Blutnenthal & Morone. 2009,

p.

109). He proposed establishing "reinsurance" in which the government would rely on private
carriers to improve and expand coverage. In addition, his plan called for building and expanding

Obarnn's I Iealth Care

ftelbrrl

7

health tacilities. addressing the shorta-u:e of'health care personncl. irnproving pLrblic health

programsand regulation. caring torthe nrentally ill. prevention, diergnosis ernd treatruent ol'
delinquent youth. and increarsing presence withirr the international cornltlunity. specifically the

World Health Organization (Dr.r'ight D. Eisenhower Foundation. 2000: Eisenhower. 1955).
With no public optior-r arvailable. the private health sector continued to grow. At the same
time,

tl-re

private sector began placing more stipulations and regulations on health care. As

a

result, groltps sltch as the clderly ancl poor fbund it harder and harder to af1brd qr-rality care. The

elderly, employers. unions and Congress alike recognized the need to care fbr the elclerly and the

initial Medicare prograrr was born. John F. Kennedy

enclorsed the proposal on the camparign

trail and Llpon taking otflcc in 1961. Once zrgain providers. insurers. business and political
grolrps adanrantly opposed the bill and Medicare proposed by President Kenned,y during his
tenttre was blockecl. I'ollowing Kennedy's assassination in I963. Vice Presidcnt .lohnson toclk
over and, afier his larrdslide victory

in

1961. nrade Medicare his top

priority. Medicare

ancl tlie

sr:bseqttent Medicaid prograllls rnacle it through Congress in March 1965" sen,ing the elder"ll' and

poor popr"rlations (Birn. et al 2003:Gorsky.2010).

The 1970s experiettced a growing economy but inflertion and health care costs were on
the rise. Health care insnrance remained zrhot topic in the wake of civil rights and labor
Irlovements of the 1970s. Numerous bills and legislation were introduced. with contpeting

legislation fiom each party such as President Nixon with ltis Comltrehen.sit,e I{eulth lnstu"urtc'c
Plan (CHIP) and Senator Ted Kennedy who introduced the Heulth Security Act (Kaiser Farnily
For-rndation, 2009). President Nixon "was the first Republican president to accept the prerrrise
the all Americans should have health insurance..." (Blumenthal

& Morone, 2009, p. 17).

He
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proposed national health insurnncc cr.rnstructed around errplol,ers. with government trlling in the
gaps.

1974 is noted as a year that
receivecl bi-partisan sllpport

fiorl

refbnr carnc close til becomin-{ reality,

politiciarns

arncl

as refbrm efforts

the political environment was such that special

interests on all sides did not want to be seen blockirrg the progr"ess. However, national and
Congressior-ral politics experienced an irlr-nediate shifi when the Wartergate scandal broke. Irlone

of the proposed prograrns sLlcceeded and support in general began to waver (Birn et al.,2003;
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). Hor.vever. it laid the fl'aurework 1br firture presidents and

administrations, as nrany have been known to use variations of Nixon's plan in refbrrn ef1brts

-

including President Obama (Blr-rmentharl & Morone. 2009).
President Carter camc to

oflcc

1L)77 ancl aclvociited national health

refbrm. His prirnary

concern was to do so by controlling heiilth carre spcncling. as he canre into oflrce fircing rising
energy costs, mountin-u inflation and sk'rrv econor-nic growth (The White House.2010). He
delivered a plan to Congress in 197()- rl,hich nffcrccl a phascd-in approach to address
f-inancial concerns

sr-rcl-r

(Srlith. 1993). Ilorvever. his adrnirristration Iacked legislative strength

and

other dornestic issues took precedence including cliverting an energy crisis, deregulation of truck
and airline industries, and improving the environrnent. In addition, prior to President Carter

taking otflce the political process had intensifred clue to the Watergate scandal. and bills and
legislation were lbrced to go through nrore tirne-consnllin-{ layers. With additional checks and
balances in place, nothing signifrcant rvas accornplished on the health care front during Carter's

tirne in oftlce.
President Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and imrnediately implemented tax
cnts. increased military spending and slashed spending on domestic programs such as Medicaid.

Olranra's Ilealtlr Care
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Health care refbrnr was not on the president's priority' list. but he experienced uncxpected
backlash when his administration proposed nraking clranges to Mcdicarc berrefits as part olthe
social security legislation. Medicare is said to have avoided the sanre fate due to the

nrobilization of the elderly and their allies and, in fact. thc threat o1'losirrg sr-rch an important
grolrp olsr-rpporters fbrced the adrninistration to take up the issue olcare fbr elderly in a much
greater capacity than they ever anticipatecl. That. in acldition to the lran-Contra ,.unauf
changed the public's perception of Reagan. He began losing people's trust and

ars

.

a result

supported a large Medicare expansion for the elderly to keep thenr on his side. T'he legislation
wtls reversed in the next round of Congress and therelbre was rrot irlplernented. but health care
was heavily debated under President Reagan's watch.
President George H. W. Bush participated

rliniurallf in thc debate.

adcling health care tax

creclits and purchasing pools to the list of refbrm proposals. neither ol-which received nruch

support. President Bush had a light domestic zrgenda and his eflbrts were fbcused nlore on
tbreign matters such as operation Desert Storm in r,l'hich the LI.S. sent troclps to dcf-end Kuwait
against lraqi president Saddam Hussein. Health care renrained dorrnant again until the election
o1'President

Bill Clinton in

1993.

President Clinton campaigned heavily on healtlr care in the 1q92 presidential election,
and

it remained one of the prominent issues on his agenda once in ofhce. With

- controlled Congress and with health care already top of mind with the public

a democratically

fiorl

the

carrrpaign trail, some kind of reform seemed prornising.

Nearly every major health care interest group had endorsed sr:bstantial retbrms-grandiose ones, in fact. The American Medical Association (AMA) and Health lnsurance

Association of America (HIAA), the two great, l-ristoric bastions of opposition to

Otrarnii"s Ilealth Care
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compr-rlsory health insurance. both went orr record in support o1'ttn entplo,ver litiutdate and
runiversal coverage. Even the U.S. Chamber olCotrurerce cnclorsed att ertrployer
rnandate. as did many large corporations. Other groLlps crrnre out variously fbr refbrnr

options that ran along a spectrunr fronr Canadian-style. single-payer prograrns on the leli

to rlanaged competition and medical savings accounts and raclicarl changes in tar policy
on the right. Under the circumstances, it was easy to believe the country was ready fbr
substantial refbrrn and that a market-oriented, conslrrner-choice approach to universal
coverage. positioned in the center, could become a platfbr"rn fbr consensus (Starr. 2004.

para.5).
lJnder President Clinton's helm. the Heulth Securitlt

11r'1

was proposecl based on six

principles: "seclrrity. simplicity. savings, quality, choice and responsibilit,v" (Clinton" 1993. p.

17). The plan inclr"rded "universal coverage, employer and ir-rdiviclual nrandatcs. corilpetition
between private insurers. and (regulation) by governnrent to keep costs clown. LJndcr tnanaged

competition private insurers and providers wor-rld conrpete lbr the busirress r>l'groups of hLrsiness
and individuals in what were called "health purchasirrg alliances""(l(aiser [rarttil\' [joundation.

200e. p. 7)

While the plan had the best of intentions, a variety of issues challenged its fate f}om day

one. The first issue

w-as

the creation of the 5O0-member Task Force to Refbrrn Health Care.

which was established in.lanuary 2003 with First Lady Hillary Clinton appointed to lead the
charge. The working groups were set up to conceive and provide input on plans as part of the
task fbrce, but who actually served on the task fbrce and their respective roles remained a

mystery, as a blanket of secrecy was pr-rt over the groups frorn day one. "The emphasis on
secrecy began when the health care task force was set up in the flrst weeks of the Adrninistration.

Olrama's Health Cale Re lbrnr I
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Congressional aicles ancl others r,vho u'orkc'd on clevelo;lin-rr the plan were told not to talk to
reporters. and the Adrnirristration tried to keep their nulrres secret" (Clymer'. 1994. para.30).
Years later. doctors and cor-rsllnrers liled a lau,slrit ergerinst the adrninistrartion to seek access

tt-r

records of the task torce that developed the plan. irrclLrdirrg the nanres of those who served. Both

chief architect of the plan. lra Magaziner. a senior policy advisor to President Clintorr. and

Hillary Clinton found themselves in court over" the very

issue

just one year later (Pear, 1994).

It is true that nrenrbers olthe task tbrce were sworn to secrecy and asked not to speak to
the press or puhlic about their rvork. hr-rt the Adn-rinistration claiurs it was becanse "they did not
want articles appearing about thc hcalth care legislation r,vhen everybody was tocused on the

budget" (Clymer. 1994. para. 28). In addition. there is a common misconception abor"rt the role
of the Task Force in developing the proposed Wlrite IIor-rse plan. It was only set r-rp to clevelop
preliurinary options

ernd

infbrnration. not to concluct negotiations. In fact.

...the Irresident's Task Irorce
senior ofJlcials

-

-

urr-rsisting of nrembers of the cabinet and several other

provecl to be useless lirr leaching decisions aurd drafiing the platn. It

irnrnediately becarne thc subject ol litigation and dissolved at the end of May without
making any recorlmenclations. Bill Clinton actually never gave up control of the policymaking process. and the work f'ell to a snrall team of advisors and analysts that (lra)
Magazirrer directed... The decisit-rn meetings abor"rt tl,e plan took place or-rtside the fbrrnal
strr-rcture of-the task fbrce. usuzrlly in

tlie Itoosevelt Room of the White House. and the

president ran the meetings hirlself (Starr" 2007. para.4).

This point perhaps lends itsellto the arglunent that the plan was created behind closed

doors. However, Paul Starr (2004), a senior policy advisor who served under President Clinton,
sr.rggests that

"(e)very president works up proposals "behind closed doors" betbre presenting

Augsburg College LibrarY
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them. The real problern was that tinre was spent developing a plan that should have been spent
negotiatirrg

it..."

(para. 11). Clertainll, the Pre"sident needed a r,r,orking groLtp to dcvelop tlre plan,

but at a tundamental level. the core olthe plan should have been developed and then the rest left

tbr negotiation with nrembers of Congress.
Additional issues cited were the

ler-rgth and

cornplexity of'the plan. Topping 1,400 pages.

the plan was dif flcult to explain and arguments suggest that it w.as not clearly coltlntLtnicated to
the public (J.F.L. 1994, p38a). "l'*Jo universal. cornprehensive coverage

will ever be achieved in

the U.S. without an active mobilization of the popr-rlation (especially progressive fbrces) so as to
balance and neutralize the enormolls resistance tiorrr sonte of the nrost important flnancial
lobbies in the nation" (Trlavarro.2007. para.

l3).

Generatirrg pul-rlic support is critical.

Hillary Clinton championed the plan by speaking to Congress, insurzince grolrps

ernd

ar-rd the

medical

plof'ession. in addition to hosting town hall fbrLrrns thror-rghout thc colrntry. 'fhe ach-ninistration
also pr-rblished a book by President Clinton entitled I{eulth .t'cc'urittt; tlrc I'r'cs'iclent's Report to the
Arnaricun peoplc " that outlined the plan. Despite her hest el'lbrts. I lillary was r-rot able to make
the plan meaningful to the majority of'the public.
Competing plans fiom both Democrarts and Republicans w'ithirr Congress were presented

which only complicated the conversation. In addition. nrid-term elections
corner. and Republicans who initially supported refbnn eflbrts

their own plans

- aligned

Party's position.

-

\A,ere -jr.rst

around the

some who had even proposed

on defbating President Clinton's ir-ritii'rtive to strengthen the Republican

"All the elernents of the conservative coalition, from

the anti-taxes to the social

conservatives,, rnobilized against the Clinton health plan and agetinst the Clintons personally,

while liberals were ambivalent and Democrats in Congress were divided. Newt Gingrich, Grover
Norquist, Bill Kristol, and other figures in the conservative movement saw health reform as an
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icleological threat beczurse ilit succeeded. it might rencw Nerv Deal beliet-s in thc elficacy'of
governnrent. whereas a clefbat o1-the health plar-r coulcl se1 libcralisnr back lbr years'f Stul',. 2007.
parar. 29).

The next issue was that Hillary Clintor-r becanre the fhcc o1-- ancl thc'Clinton narre
synonymor"rs

with

-

health care relbrm. Criticisms ol'her involvernent began with her

appointment to the lead the Task Force, jr-rst nine days after Prcsiclent Clinton's inaugr,rration.
She greatly expanded the First Lady's role beyond that of'her preclecessors and challenged the
status qr-ro in many ways, while controversy sllrrounded some of'heractions and leadership style

(Burden & Mugahn. I 999). For example. she was acclrsed of holding
-['ask

se

crct mectings of

tl-re

Irorce behind closed doors and would not release the narres ol-aides rvorking on the plan to

the public. In addition. there was a perception that her str,'le \\'as conrbative and she was not

willing to conrplor"t"tise. believing strongly that the proposeci plarr u,as thc riglrt approach
(Clynrer. 1994). RepLrblicans began ref-erring to the plan as "l Iillarycarc . il tcrnr that has since
come to defrnc the failed atternpt at refbrm dr-rring Presiclent t'lir.ttur-r's tinre in ofllce (Navarro.
2007).

Interestingly, the First Lady was not involved in prelir"ninarv refbrm con\ersations;
President Clinton already had a fiamework in mincl when he appoirrtccl her to leacl the charge and
opposing arglrments suggest Hillary took the fall lbr her hr,rshzrncl's tailed etlbrt (Sterrr. 2007). At
the sanre tiure, the White House was

willing to and did cornpronrise tiorn the begir-rning. For

example, "(w)hen he made managed competition part of his plan in the fall o1'1992, Clinton was

moving toward the center right and laying the basis fbr a firtr,rre deal with the conservative
Democrats and moderate Republicans who also backed rnanaged-cornpetition proposals" (Starr,
2007, para.27). The task fbrce reportedly met with 572 separate organizations. including
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senators. representatives nncl stafl. to -uet input ancl ideas to help shape the plan. l-he

etdrninistration then took the inpLrt arrd nrade recor-nrrrendatiorrs based on what they'belicvcd was
the best coLlrsc ol't-tction. 'I-lre irrtentiorl wrls to maintain the core of the progranr u,hile creating
the opportunity fbr layers to be peeled ofTas necessary. The overall ef1brt is said to havc been

the biggest outreach elTort ever in laying the gror-rndwork Ibr a bill (Fallows. 1995). Hou,ever.

in the end. was ther-e was no compromise on the behalf of opponents who sought only to def'eat
the Clintons. nor was there slrpport tbr any of the other proposed bills on the larble. Flillary
indicated that. "cvery time w'e uroved toward them, they would rllove away" (Fallows. 1q95"
para. 68).

After its

c'lel'eat. rnembers

of the adrlinistratiolr recognized that they hacl undercstimated

hor,r,ntan)'menrlrcrs of ('ongress wor"rld backpedal atier initially showing sllpport ltlr relitrrn.
werc Lrnprepal'ccl lirr the level ol'resources opponents would expend to def-eat it. ancl expressed
thert they' shoulcl have been

lrore transparent with the press and public.

as their unintencled

actions behind the scerres onlv f'ed the story of secrecy w'ithin the Wlrite House irnplied by
Republicans.

Neither l.he Heulth Securit),Ac'l nor any other refbrm ef'fort ever saw'thc light of day. as

rlid-terrl elections gave RepLrblicans control of both the House and Senate fbrthe flrst time in 40
years (Cly'rner.2004). "'[-he collapse of health care reform in the f-rrst two years ol'the Clinton
adn-rinistrettion

will

go down as one of the great lost political opportunities in Arnerican history. It

is a story of cotnpromises that never happened, of deals that were never closed, ol Republicans.
moderate l)emocrerts. and key interest grolrps that backpedaled fiom proposals they themselves
had earlier co-sponsored or endorsed.

It is also a story of strategic miscalculation on the part of

the president and those olus who advised him" (Starr,2004, para. 5). However. all was not lost
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during Clintorr's tinre in olllce. During his second term in of1lce in 1997. the presiderrt" along

witlr a Repr-rblican-controlled Congress. enacted the (-/iiitlt'cn'.t'Ilculth In,t'ttrunc'e Progrunt,
whicl-r built upon the Medicaicl program to provide health care to rnore low-inconre children.

George W. Buslr served as president tr"on'r 2001-2008. He has been described as being

hands-off president, except wlren it canre to health care. The

Br-rsh

a

administration, w'hich was

generally conservative. achieved the largest expansion in Medicare's history and the biggest
health care entitlement in fbur decades (Blumerrthal & Morone. 2009). As opposed to ltis father

who shied away fiorn donrestic issues such as health care. President George W. Bush chose to
tackle health

.u...

FIis

initial proposal containecl three aspects: 1) n-rake health insurance

premiums paid by employers on behallol-employees firlly taxable:2) redirect ftrnds the f'ederal
government spends on health care to state govenrors to help their state residents attain health
insurance access; and 3) allou,Anrericans to cleduct money trorn taxable income (Reinhardt"

2007). While the final bill hardlv resenrbled his initial vision. Bush is credited with the passing
of the Mediccrre ll4odat'nizulion.rlc't. w'hich sought to provide seniors and individLrals with
disabilities with a prescriptiorr drug trenef rt. rrore choices, and better beneflts under Medicare
(Centers tbr Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010).

Every president has leti a nrark on healtl-r care. yet there are many grolrps, trends

atnd

outside factors that greatly inflr-renced each president's point of view along the way.
Whul Othar Fuclor.t Huve Influencetl Heulth Cure Refbrm'l
There are a number of theories. trends and outside factors that have signiticantly

influenced the health care debate. In addition, key stakeholders including patients, medical
associations, insurance and pharmaceutical companies' power and inf}-rence must also be
explored.

Ol-ranra's
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c.t und 7i'e ncls'
A nurlber of theories exist that seek to explairr the current state ot'lrealth care in the LI.S.

beginning witlr path dependency,which is "the idea thzit clecisions terken early on carl

significantly constrain possibilities fbr change later irr tinre" (Ciorsky'.2010. para. 3).
Specitically related to health care, ideas fbr improving czrre or operations are nret with resistance
sirnply because of being accustomed to

tl-re

way things

har.,e

always been done (Hacker. 2009).

Consider that initial insurance and health care plzrns grew to meet the denrands of conslrrrers.

Without

a

public plan in place. the private sector fllled in the gaps to meet those demands. As the

private market continued to grow, it becarne increasingly dil'licult to introcluce new plans or
proposals. "'fhe cost of change grew insurnror-rntable

anrJ

existirrg arrangcnrenls becanre

'.locked" into place" (Peterson. 2005, p1681).
Sirrrilarly. Gordon (2003) outlines three conrmon cxplanatior-rs fbr the lack olhealth care,

which include the institutionalist, liberal or plurerlist ancl raclical vicw,s. Corclon
of these perspectives is particularly

adeqr-rate

argLres that none

fbr explaining thc lack of health care in the U.S..

but that each has played a role in shaping refbrnr as it stands toclal'.
Path dependency most closely aligns with the irrstitr-rtionetlist point of view. which
suggests that our political system was created in such a w'a)' that makes it structurally biased

against comprehensive refbrm of any kind (Cordon. 2003). Patterns. nrles. norms. process,
bel,

avior and structures exist and come to be fbllowed in

er

sell'-perpctuating manner. The

institution exists with the prirnary concern of maintaining strr,rcture. which is in direct opposition
to tl-re primary concern of refbnn, which is action. Refbrm puts pressure on and challenges the
pattems, rules, norms:, process, behavior and structures created by the institution and in most
cases, the institution wins simply because

it

is established. In the case of health care, the
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institLrtior-r irtvitecl private zrlternativcs and conservatives were alrle to usc its li'agntetrted state ancl

the political culture to fi'Lrstrate refbrm (Gordon.2003). '"I'he ke.v point is thaI tlic political
institLrtions of'thc U.S. tend to impede deep and contentious refornrs" (Gorsl<,v.2010. para. 12).

'l'he libcrarl or plLrralist perspective sr-rggests that the U.S. cloes not have health care clue to
"popular or cultural taith in private soh-rtions and a distrr"rst o1''radical' political solutions"
(Gordon.2003.

p.3). These solutions stemmed fiom dernographic.

demands of industrialization" and created a deep seeded belief in the
solr,rtions to social problerns"

econontic arrd political

"ctlicacl, oltnarket

(Gordon.2003.p.3). For instance. the idea of a public plan is one

of w,hich nrany have been adamantly opposed. "A public plan is vierved as a step too far fbr

a

colrntry that has resistance to expansive government locked irr its DNIA" ("Hazards"" 200c).
para.1

1

).

-l'he

raclical view sug-{ests that the lack of Arnerican heetllh policf is a reflcctiot-t o1'class

politics ancl a w,eakness of the workingclass. Simply put, the people who necded it tlost \\ere
nut includecl in the conversation or if they were. involvetleut

\,vas as a

token but trot consiclcred

signilicarnt. Tliere is criticisrn that elitists and academics built plans hehincl closed doors withor-rt
public inpr"rt. ''Politics have fiustrated, rather than reflected. popular aspirettions and values"

(Gordon.2003.p. 7). HofTrnan (2003) concurs, stating "national health refbrm catnpaigns in the
10tl' centllry \\'ere initiated ancl run by elites rnore concerned with clef-ending a-gainst attacks fl'orn

interest grollps than with popular mobilization..." (para. 2).

It is difllcult to come to an agreement on the best refbrm for the country when there

are

firndamc'ntal difl-erences in how people approach this issue and. more specifically. how to pay fbr

it. "The long health care debate breaks down into three eras, each with

its own model of health

care rooted in a difl-erent version of politics and market...each is analytically distinctive. each
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clifl-erent philosophl'. ancl each rellects the spirit
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ol'its timc. We utight sunrrlarize

the

three approaches as robust govenrnrent. a rnix ol'governurent and merrket. ancl robust ntarkets"

(Blumenthal & Morotte.2009. p. 11). I-lealth care is thc sixth biggest indLrstry irr the

LJ.S.

meaning it is irr"rportant to rnaintetin. br-rt who rllns it and who pays fbr it are the ditflcult

questions. Sonre believe that health care is a tr-rndarnental right of every citizen and that it is the
governntent's obligation to help provide and pay fbr health care, w'hile others believe thc
government has no hr"tsirress being involved and it is up to individuals to provide fbr therrselves.
Regardless olapproach. expanding health insurance has never

tit any budget.

and the ability

of

the president to introduce major refbrm is nrost ofien linrited by the cost and economics

(Blumenthal & Morone. 2009).
Two additiotral trends within the recent health

carre debate

nray have operred the cioor firr

recent refilrm. Prentiunrs lrztve shot up. making insr-rrance increasingly rnore expensive ancl

dif1lcult fbr enrployers and individr.rals to maintain. and LJ.S. companies are increasingly
competin-e with tlrrrts in othercountries where health insurance is rarely oflltrecl. nreanirrg LI.S.

employers pay fbr benellts. while their cornpetitors do not (Appleby, 2008).
Key Stukeholtler.t'

Otrtside of presidents and policy rttakers, a number of key stakeholders have

Lreerr

instrumental in shaping the health care debate such as patients. rnedical associations. insurancc
companies and pharmaceutical cornpanies. all olwhom implore lobbyists to champiorr tlreir'ow,l-r

specific goals and needs. This section introduces the stakeholders and the intlr-rence they have
had on health care refbrm.

Throughout history, lobbyists have played an integral part in shaping health care. and the
same held true in the most recent refbnn etlbrt. According to Eaten

& Pell (2010):
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(M)ore than 1,750 conrpanics and organizations hired abor"rt 4.525 lobbyists
each

nrembelof-Cong

-

eight fbr

to inlluence health refbrnr trills in 2009. The list of-

companies and organizations that u,orked to put their imprint on legislatior-r is diverse.
ranging tl'om health care intelests and aclr,ocacy grollps to giant corporations. small
businesses. Arnerican lndian tribes. religioLrs groLlps. and universities. Arnong industries,

207 hospitals lined up to lobby. lbllowed by 105 insurance companies and 85

manufhcturing companics. 'l'rade. advocacy. and prol-essional organizations trr"rmped
them all with 745 registered groups that lobbied on lrealth refbrn-r bills. illustrating the
common Washington str"zrtegy ol special interests banding together to pool money and
increase their influence (para. 3-5).

In total. it is estir-nated that lo[rb1,ists spcrrt nrore tharr $1.2 billion on their eflorts. signilying the
importance and complexitl, ol' thc issuc.
Health care exists due to corlsllnre r clenrand and necd, and patients are the consllmers of
health care. Prirnary patient concerns irrclLrcle accessibility. qLrality and cost of coverage. The
biggest challenge fiom the pattient point of'view is that every individual, family or gror-rp has
ditl-erent rnedical needs and priorities. One explanation 1br stalled health care refbnn is that
there has not been one consistent voicc or advocate on

behallol'all patients. Health care refbrm

lacked grass roots mobilization. which is olierr at tlre heart of refbrrn. Consider the history of
social movements in the LJ.S.

-

civil righls. l'errinist. elderly, disabled

-

each grolrp has its

own specific needs atrd dernands. and each applied a piece-rneal approach to address those needs
and demands

(Hoffman.2003). As each grollp set out to see their individual needs met, the issue

became more and more segmented and set the tone fbr firture groups to

fbllow suit. One

example of a group that advocates fbr individual needs is the American Association fbr Retired
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Persons (AARP). a non-govemnrental organization arrci irrterest grurlrp that exists to address the

concerns and rreeds of people overthe age of 50. AARP deploy'cd 56 in-hoLrse lobbyists and twcr
fl'onr outside

flnls

to work the issr-re on behall'ol'its rnemhers cluring recent refbrtn eflbrts (Eaten

& Pell. 2010).
A specific example within the medical prof-ession is the American Medical Association.
(AMA).

a

profbssional organization that serves as the voicc ol the physicians and residents.

With more than 230.000 members. it is the largest prof'essional orgeurization in the U.S. The

AMA believes that "the future of medicine should

be decidecl by physicians

-

not legislators or

private interests like insr-rrance companies" (AMA-ASST!.org.2010). For-urded irr 1847. its
prinrary functions have evolved over tirne and have inclr"rclecl representing the profbssion.
providing scientiflc infbrmation to keep its merntrers infbrnrec-I. providirlg socioecononric

inlbrrlation that irlpacts the prof-ession. provicling data on thc prof-ession itself. nraintaining
eclucational standards, plus maintaining the strength ol'tlre orgar-lizattion ancl rclationships with
cit1,'. state and other special groups

of interest (Canrpion. 1984).

Historically. the AMA has been one of the most vocal opponcnts o1'health care retbnn.
spending hundreds of millions of dollars to hanrmer its point of'view horne with legislators and
patients. "The influence of the American Medical Association (AMA) and others in the

Anrerican setting reflected not the natural resonance ol their rressage but the immense resollrces
that they brought to bear on American politics ar-rd public debate" (Gordon. 2003,p.

4). Primary

concerns over time have included the impact refbrm would have on private medical care, Iimits
placed on private initiatives and the freedon-rs of physicians to do theiriobs. government

involvement in the medical process, and the potential of government dictating medical decisions
that wonld impact its members (Campion. 1984; Gorsky.2010). These concerns were no
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diftercnt within reccnt rcfbrm ctlbrts. lnt the AMA rvas r,villing to worlt with the presiclent and
Iawmetkers fbr two reasor-rs. F-irst. the AM,r\ agreecl rvith the administration that continuing

or1

the sanre path was Llnacceptable. AMA President J. James Rohack stated. "(w)e think cloirrg

nothing wor-rld only atccelerate the total flrealthcare] costs to Arnerica and increase the total
trunrberof uninsured. and we know already that they live sickeranddie younger if access to their
rnedical care is the enrergency room" (Lowes. ?010. para.4). While they did not a-sree witlr
everythir-rg irr the plan. the

AMA

pref-erred to have a seat at the table rather than he cut out ol-the

conversation completely. which some organizations experienced when opposing refbnn ("LI.S.

Doctors Divided." 2010). "-['he pending bill isn't perfbct. but we can't let the perf-ect be thc
enenry of the good" (l-owes.20l0. para2). hr 2009, the AMA employed 33
and spetrt tnore than $20 rrrillion in loblrying Congress on behalf

firll-tirlc

lobhy'ists

of its nrembers (lratcn & Pell.

2010)

Sinrilar to the AMA. insuratrce providers'prirlary cor-rcerns surrounding health carc
refi-rrrn have been regulation in addition to potential loss of revenlle

llrst iltsllrance plans began during the Civil War and covered the

(Gorskr,.20l0). I'he

r,'crv

insr-rred against accidents

lj'orl

travel by rail or steamboat. Massachr-rsetts Health lnsurzrnce of Boston issued the first gror,rp

policy otl-ering comprehensive coverage in 1847. and the f-rrst individual arrd illness policies
evolved around 1890 ("History of Health." 2009). During the early 1900s. thc National
Convention of Itrsurance Commissioners developed the first rnodel of state law fbr regLrlating
health insurance. In the 1930s, the nonprollt Blr-re Cross and subsequent Blr-re Shield plans began

in response to the need dr-rring the Great Depression (Corsky,2010). Providers otlbred discor.rrrts
to the plans in exchange fbr increased volurne and prompt payrnent ("History of Heerlth," 2009).
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Essentially. insur-ance ploviciers acivocate the robr"rst rlarket perspective. since it allows thenr thc
greatest control o\/er pricing

arncl

sen,iccs (i.e." protitability).

Since the governntent was nclt able to creatc a-rtreeable solutions in terms ol'public

options. private insurance plans grew to rreet the derr-rand. While the actr.ral number of plans
available to consumers toda;- is debatable.

{,,11

,Vslr,,r' und Wor"ld Repor'l recently reviewed 730

commercial. Medicare. and Medicaicl health plans as part of their "Best of" series. 'fhe sheer
number of available plans serves to highlight the breadth and the complexity of the issue

(Comarow, 2009). While the numt-rer of plans grew, so did the providers' ability to choose the
ideal candidates to cover. to chargc higher premiurns and to even refuse to cover (i.e.. tl-rose witJr

pre-existing conditions). Healthy nrenrbers cost less than sick members. and it has become
increasingly dif1icult fbr those rvho really need coverage to get coverage. Insurance proviclers do
not want the governtnent telling thertr u'ho they,'n-rr-rst cover or the types of coverage they rtrust

otl-er. At the same tinre. conrl-retition fbr healthy menrbers is flerce, as is w.itnessed by the
number of plans available in the rlarket.

While insttrance providers are concerned w"ith covering additional rnembers,
pharmaceutical cotnpanies are harppy r,r,'ith the addition of more insured patients. More patients

with access to health care Ireans a larger pool of people eligible fbr drugs, and pharmaceutical
companies main concerns are with profits and regr-rlaLion. Like insurance providers, they adhere

to the robust market perspective. even though their prirnary interests difl'er. In 2009, LI.S. sales of
pharmaceuticals grew 5.1 percent. reaching $300.3 billion (fMS Health,2010). It remains
number three 1n Forlttne nlagazine's top indLrstries fbr return on revenue and assets, and nurnber

tlve in retum on shareholder equity (Fortune.com, 2009). Pharmacer-rticals are a big business and
a

major lobbyist, with organizations such as the Pharmaceutical Research & Manut-acturers of
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Arnerica por"rring more than $26 million in lobb-v e lhrts. ancl the overall inclustry slielling

oLrt

more than $40 in the frrst three rnonths o1'200t) alone (Centcr fbr Responsive Politics.20l0:
Seabrook and Overby.20l0). The ir-rdustr1,'has used its cloLrt to nraintain a sezrt at the reibrm
table.

Health care has been on every presiclerrt's agenda lbrthe past century. regardless of
whether a president intended it to be. Key issr-tes influenccd the ability to create change.

including ideological difl-erences. the lobtrying strength o1'special interest
international events, and even the system itself-.

-fhe

gror-rps. domestic and

acconrplishments. challenges and def-eats in

health care mirrored the sentiment of the tirnes. yet were signilicarrtly influenced by presiderrtial
leadership.

Whut is Prc.yitlcnt iul /.cudcrsltip'/
Every president comes to ofTlce with a dilfcrent arpproach. agenda antl set ol'challenges.

"But despite all the variation,

we

've watcl-recl tlre nation's health citre tror-rbles climb Llp every

presiderrt's agenda. Each presiderrt had to thce up to thc issue. Ancl when he clid

-

whether in

good tirnes or bad... each encountered the sirnre stuhborn recluirements of presidential

leadership" (Blr-rmenthal & Morone,200t). p.410). What

erre

therequirenrents of presidential

leadership? How do they impact a presiclent's role and the ability to lead'? In this section, I will
explore deflnitions and challenges facin-u presidents. along w,ith a brief overview of trends
impacting presidential leadership today such as inrage creation" perception and the media.
De.fini t ions ctnd

C

hctllenge s

Ever since George Washington was sworn in as the first president of the Llnited States,
the role of president has continually evolved and changed with every individual who has had the

privilege of serving in the role. The role of the president as or-rtlined in the Constitution is
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extrentely vzlglre" witlr the rnajoritl, of the space dedicated to how each ltrcsiclcnt should be
elected versLrs outlining the specific goals or tasks (Watcr"ntan. Wright.

.'Virtually every Arnerican. fiom seven to seventv.

has a list

&

St. ('lair'" 1999).

olcriteria ol-what rnahes a "good"

president. Yet. when corrsultingthe r"rltirnate authority. Article IIol'the ('olrstitution. rvhich
delineates the firnctions and duties of the president, one notices hon'short. sketchy. vagr,re. and

almosttrivial the description of the of1lce appears" (Dentorr.200-5. p.26). -l-he.iobs that were
assignecl are extrenrel], broad" such

as()ommunder-in-(hicf d'lhe.lrnt.t'trntlArn'l,, but little

description ot'parameters provided beyond mention. As Blunrenthal arrd Murone (2009) point
out. "there is no owner's manual fbr rr"rnning the White llouse" (p. 7).
Three governmental branches exist in tl-re Urritecl States: executir,c" lcgislative and

iudicial. The original

idea was tl-rat each brtrnclr would lrarrc separiitc po\\crs vvlrile serving as a

check fbr the others to ensure balance of power. Neither Congress n()r thc president could rnake
a decision withor-rt the support or buy-in of the other. and tl-re.iLrdicial branch coulcl ovcrturn any
decisior-rs

it lelt were unconstitutional or beyond the power

o1'the cNecutivc ancl legislative

bratrches. While the original intention of the separatiorr ol'power was lbr tlre branches to
conrplernent one another. the lines between thern lrave becorre incr"eersirrgll' blurred and there is a

widely accepted argulrent that the branches of governrnent conrpete u,ith onc another (Mari &
McCaffiey. 2008; Neudstadt: 1 960).
While every president has lefi his tlark on the presidcncv. Wooclrorn, Wilson was the t'irst
to "break through the barriers dividing president and Congress arrd unite Lroth thror-rgh a common
policy agenda initiated by the president" (Mari & McCat'fiey. 2008.

p

73

).

In an cffort to gairr

power, Wilson took his case fbr policy creation and refbrrn to the people. lJpon selling his
vision and generating public sr-rpport. he then had the nleans to go back to C'ongress to address
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what he clainred lvas the clesirc' of'the people. The president and Congrcss rvoulcl agree to arr
agenda ancl ertrrerts in the speciflc flelds wor-rld then execute the

atctr-rzrl

work under the

president's direction. Within todal"s political t}amework, this nriglit be ref'en'ed to as innovative
leadership. whereas a candidate or president persuades the public that tl-re visions. plans and
-toals tlrat lnake

Lrp

the errcl-ritectural plarrs fbr the nation are, in fact. desired by the n-rajority

(Denton.2005).
Ilavin-q a Ina-lority does not necessarily mean holding all of the power" and presidential

power is onc the great paradoxes of the oftce. The president is considered one of'the most
powerfirl people in the

r,'u,orld.

yet at the same time, one can only accomplish so rtruch in thc role.

As Denton (2005) explains:
The ofllce always seents too strong or too weak. A president appeerrs to herve too rnuch

po\\el' lbr the r*tiro,ion of "self'-rule" while lacking enough power to solve the nation's
tt-tttst

critical problenrs. flre American pr-rblic. as the story goes. wants a contnton nran in

the White House but erpects uncofflmon leadership. The public denrands tlrat
be above ""politics" while fbrgetting that to be elected

ar"r

ar

president

individual must be. above all.

politician. Bv acting clecisively, the president is labeled "dictatorial"

a

and

"Llnconstitt-ttional." But by tailing to act decisively. the president is called "passive" and
",uveak". (p. 25)

Presidential power also is conditional. "Depending upon specif-rc individuals and
situations, the presiderrcy is always either too powerful or not powerful enough. The president

should'-take care of.'something or "keep out" of an affair. As a nation we are qr"rick to call fbr
decisive action and equally quick to yell "foul""(Denton, 2005, p. 37). For exarnple, after the
attacks on September l

l,

President Bush took his role of Comrnander-in-Chief-to heart. acting in
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a way he and his advisors deternrined rvas best

firr tlie country'' irncl r-rsing hisiurisdictior-r to nrake

such decisions on his o\vn accord (Stevenson.2005). Congress and the public were initially'
sr"rpportive of the tough stance and allorvecl tlie president sonre leewal'to

respond. As Bush

fbund or-rt. presidents remtrin subfect to the constraints. chccks ancl balances of the system. The

legislative and judicial branches of gover"nnrent began to question the liberlies the executive
branch elected to take and dee rled some ol his actions. such as policies slrrrolrnding the holding
and torturing of detainees. Lrnconstitr,rtional. This is one exarlple where

"(i)n the American

system of goverttntettt. strong executive leadership is at once unavoidable and Llnacceptable"

(Mari & McCatfrey, 2008. p. 96).
With little in the way of lole clarity orcleflnition, it appears that the president must
instead live up to expectations created hy the public. Increasingly. there is a gap betw'een what
the public expects of its presidents and rvhat prcsiclcnts actr-rally

car-r

accornplish

- otherwise

known as the expectations gap thcsis (Watenran et al.. 1999). Fanlecl political scientist Richard
Neudstadt (1980) wrote that -'the put"rlic has conre to believe that the nran inside the White Housc

[can] do something about everything"

(p.7).

Some of these expectations include creating

successful policies. reducing Llnenrploymcnt. redr"rcirrg the cost of goventnrent, increasing
government ef1lciency. dealing et}-ectively with foreign policy. ancl strengthening national
defbnse (Waterman et al., 1999). J'l-rereirr lies the issr.re. .'The nation expects rrrore of the

President than he can possibly do. more than we give him either tl-re ar-rthority or means to do.
Thus. expecting fiom hirn the irnpossible. inevitably we shall be disappointed in his

perfbrmance" (Bronlow. 1 969, p. 35).
One particularly important and powerfirl element that is used to manage expectations in

presidential leadership is character. Shogan expressed that "character is a double-edged sword
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-

an instrunrent that carr discredit presidents ancl destrol'their creclibility but atlso one that

presiclents can use to establish their political iclentity

erncJ

nrobilize support"

1as

cited in Denton.

2005.p. 7). Iror example, according to an Associarted Press-lpsos poll, the nrajority of
Americans care less about issr,res than they clo abor-rt a canciidnte's character on the campaign

trail. Fifty-five percent of those sllrveyed consider honesty. inte-urity and other

valr"res

ol

character the most important clualities they look fbr irr a presiclential carrdidate. .lust one-third

look llrst to candidates' stattces on issues: even

f-ew'er

tilcus lbrenrost on leadcrship traits.

experience or intelligence. The poll tound honesty' was by fhr the r.nost popular single trait

-

volunteered by fbrty-one percent o1'voters in open-ended cluestionin-e. The poll of 1.001 U.S.
Adr.rlts was conducted via landline and cell phorres betrveen March

l2 and March 14,2007,

ar-rd

had a ntar-eitt of sarnpling error of plus or minus 3 perccntage poirrts.

While the poll shows sonre consensus, charractcr is a broacl c'oncetrrt that citizens think
about in many difl'erent ways. Presiclents experience an expectatior.r -uap within the qualities

citizens believe a president shoulcl possess.

-fhere

Iacks consisterrcv around what every

American believes the president's role shor"rld be and what values thev shor-rld hold. Democratic
strategist Chris Lehane (2007) states, "modern dary presiclerrtial canrpaigns are essentially
character tests, with character broadly deflrred to encompass a nrosaric of traits

-

looks,

likeability. vision. philosophy, ideology, biography. conrnrunicatiorrs skills. intelligence,
strength, optirnism, effIpathy. ethics. valLles. anrong others" (Fourr-rier & Tompson, 2007).

Similarly, Kouzes and Posner (2007) surveyed the general pLrblic over the span of two
decades and identified characteristics most adrnired in leader"s primarilv tl'orn a business

perspective. Four qualities consistently topped the list. inclr-rding honest (88%), fbrward-looking

(7lyo). competent (66%) and inspiring (66yoi), whereas historian Stephen Ambrose states that the
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qualities of a great public leader are vision. integrity. courage. urrderstzrncling. the por,vcr olarticulation. and profirndity of character (Denton. 2005).
Presiclcntial scholar Fred Greenstein (2001) ofl-ers a widely recognized review oland

fianrervork bl"rvhich to evaluate presidential leadership. lnl'he Pres'iclentiul Dif./brcnc'c, lte
explores the leadership qualities and political contexts of every president beginning with
President Roosevelt. He identif-res, reviews and rates each president's strengths and weatknesses

within six criteria ir-rcluding comrrunication, orgernization. political skill. vision. cognitive style
and ernotional irrtelligence. Based on his analysis of presidential history, he suggests that

elnotionarl irrtelligence is the most important attribr"rte by which he means nraturity ancl levelheadcdness. I"or exarnple, he states that "(y)ou want a level lread. You neecl the ahility to control

yollr enrotions. Lack of irnpulse control in a president can be fatal in the nuclear

r,r,urld'"

(Greenstein. 20 1 0. para.5).

With so many differing opinions and without a consistent clefjnitiorr in place by which to
cvaluatc prcsidential leadership, nranaging expectations and perceptiorr inadvertentlv beconre of

critical inlportautce to the president.
7'rantl,y i n Pra,t'itlenl

iul Leuclership

One way to nranage sr"rch expectations is through image crezrtion. While success can be

linkecl to that which a president actually accomplishes during his or her time in

ot1lce

inrages

play atr itlportant role in the perceived slrccess or failLrre of olrr presidents" (Waterntan et al..
1999. p.

13). While each president

develops his own personal image. Waterman et al. (1999)

outline three historical images that all presidents have adopted throughout American history.
These include common man presidents, master politician presidents and Washington or-rtsider

presidents. Along with each of these styles comes images and syrnbols that presidents take on
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along the rvay. A conrnron nran presiricnt adopts synrbols such as er log carbin or Anrericarr-tlrilt
car to show that he carr lelate to thc evcryday Arrerican: master politicians invohc a scnsc

of

action. inrpl;-ing tliey'cirn nrove thror-rghor-rt the systenr: and Washington or"rtsiclers adopt svmbolssuch as a greelr school bLrs as aclopted by tbrmer Minnesota Scnator Paul We llstonc. to show thait

they are not really a part ol-the Washington establislrment.

A president rrust crafi an image that is specific to that particular point in tinrc and tl-re
circumstances at l-rarrcl. as w'cll as an image that flts the personality of the president. Sonre
presidents understoocl this corrcept more than others. as highlighted by Waterman et al. (1c)9t)):

(T)he eftervescence and reassuring personality olFranklin Roosevelt. his irnage as a r,'ital
activist. u'as perf-ect fbr a nation in the rlidst of a depression. Eisenhor,ver as "fhther

figure" presented the pcrf-ect in-rage fbr the less active governnrental

erar

ol'the

I t)50s.

John Kerrnedy"s itrage of 1'or-rthlirl idealism was er perf-ect onc fbr the l-crrncnt ol'thc
19(r0s. Follor,ring the tirilurc of Vietnam. Reagan's image oltoLrglrness rvars idcal filr the

l9fl0s. On thc otlier

hancl. clespite his considererble accomplishnrents. I-yndon.lohnsor-r's

dour image plovecl as electorally damaging as his Vietnarn War policies. Gerald F-orcl's
itnage as a likable "klutz" did little in 1916 to convince the pLrblic thart lre wars clLralitied to
be president. Likcwise. .limrny Carter's image of vacillation ancl inefl'ectiveness lireled

his electoral defbat in 1980. (p. 14-15)

This phenomenon is coined as the lmuge-is'-Everylhing presidency. It suggests that
citizens have become nlore concerned with irnage over policy substance, and that candidates and
politicians spend atr extraordinary amount of tinre and innumerable resources developirrg

ar-r

image that will resonate with citizens. "Public expectations and perceptions are created througl-r

presidents'rhetoric, use of,symbols. rituals. and sense of history...the ot1lce is created.
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sr-rstained. ancl pernrcatecl thror-rgh interaction conrpr"ised of'carnpaigns, socialization, history

i0

ar-rd

myth" (Denton. 2005. p. 1 l).
One of the most powerfirl r,vnys presidents nranerge perception is through the rledia.

Beginning with ne\,vspapers in the days of (ieorge Washington all the way up to the social media

platfbrrls that helped get President Otlarla electecl. nreclia have played an integral role in shaping
and deflning a president's image, and presidcnts ancl their statf spend a considerable amount

of

tirne tnanaging the media. In the past. newspilpers served as tlre only opportunity to connect with
a candidate or president and

it was done so through tlre lens of the reporters or editors. but

the

advent of radio and television have allowed the president to speak directly to the public. "The
president is no longer a renrote flgure. but a pcrson known to every American with a television
set" (Waternran et al.. 1999. p. 148).
One isst-te with managing inragc thror"rgh the rledia is that media is concemed with

providing entertainnrent value vcrslrs.jr-rst reporting the ner.vs. Viewers w'ant a level of
entertainrnent so the ne\\'s isn't alu,a1's t'cportecl as it happens or is enrbellished. Regardless,

people's expectatiotrs of the president have charrged with the advent of various fbn-ns of

r-r-redia.

"Whether or not the president's perlirnrance is perceived to satisfy the public's expectations is
largely shaped by the image that is comnrr-rnicerted through the media" (Waterman et al.. 1999. p.
148).

We expect ntore today liom oLlr presidents than ever belbre, and adding to the paradox of
the offjce, those expectations are not static; they evolve depending on the point in time ancl
circumstance at hand. Citizens have dilhrent expectations of what is required. in wafiirne verslls
peacetime and in economic stability versus recession. regarding foreign atfairs or domestic

policies (Waterman et al. 1999). "Expectations shape action; action leads to further
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tl-g)

Itelixnr 3l

What the public cxpccts is shaped bv whzrt thcv knou,.

and what the1, know is shaped by what they see.

Denton (2005) sums

r-rp

the above with three nrajor fhctors that have corrtrihutecl to our

vierv of the oflice today. "Previous administrations have lcft lcgacics of presidential conduct and
bel-ravior that have contributed to the forrnation of expectations of-specific behavior. real or

perceived... The role of mass rnedia favors images over substance... and thc pulrlic's open
recogrrition that all political talk is perfbrmance (Denton. 2005. p. l2l-122).

In addition. the advent of Internet and cable television lravc allowed ncws to bc
scgnrented ancl reported based on political ancl ideological

bcliel. Liherals

arrcl conservatives

alike have a microphone through which to report news w'ith a particular lens or point ol-view
versus reporting otr the agenda proposed by the current adrnirristration. Iracts bcconre clistorted
ancl people

fbllowing news that only aligns with their political beliel.\ nri'rv not ever

heeir the

entire or true story. These trends significantly in-rpact both the pul-rlic's expectatior-rs ancl

tl-re

presiclent's role and ability to lead.

A president is elected to office on a parlicular platfbrnr.
alrcl

dr-rring a particr-rlar point in time

with a particular agenda in hand. Upon actually getting into ol'fice. a lrresident is rnet with

deep-seeded ideology, traditions. systems, nearly impossible expectations and unexpected events

tlrat are beyond the president's control. Without a clear or consistent deflnition in place,
presiclential leadership becoures known by a number of t-actors ir-rcluding the manetgerlent

of

power. expectations. vision, image, character, perception and colrlmLlnication. A president rnust

flnd a way to break through the blocks and barriers to erchieve any kind of signif rcant refbrrrr.

Ol-rarla's Ilealtlr Care
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ll"hul Lc.tson.s'('un lJe Leurnetl firotu Pusl Ra.frtrtn l:.//itt't.t"/
I\4any, attenrpts zrt

retbrnr have been rrade throu-{hout historv and there are plerrt}' tlf'case

studies. stories ancl exerrnples that a presider-rt carn study fbr keys to success and to avoicl the sanre

nristakes. In their hook l'he Heurl of Pott,ar: I-leullh und Politic',s'in the (rrul O.//it'e, Blurlenthal
and Morone (2009) explore lrealth care underthe leadership o1'the perst eleven adn-rirristrations

that served in the White House. They highlight the unique f-eatures of'each adrninistration and
or-rtline the ideas that earch pronroted. the institutions they
tutrder each

built. and the health policies pursued

administration. They ofl-er a simple deflnition ol'presidential leadership: "the abilit.v

to lay out a vision and a conrpelling case fbr moving toward it" (Blumenthal & Mrtrone.2009. p.

417). Based orr their review of past adrninistrations. they otfbr eight lessons lbr

firtLrre

adnrinistrations to achieve sllccess when atterr-rptirrg refbnn. Tlrese include prassion. spced"

bringing

et

plan. lrr"rshing the econorlists. going public. managing Con-{r'css. lbrgetting the

PSI{Os. and lcartring ltorv to lose (Blurnenthal

& Morone" 2009). While the lcssons nrav bc

applied to otltcr tvpes of refbrrn. tlieir prirrary fbcus is on health carre relbrnr. A bricIc]cscription

of each lesson is provided.
As was seelt throughout history, health ciire is a hotly debated and dir,isivc issue.

anc-l the

authors name passiorr as the tirst key to success when attempting health care relbrnr. '[he1,
suggest that. u,ith all the demands placecl on the otllce arrd the level of risk involvecl

ir-r

atternpting relbrm. only a president who feels deeply abor-rt the issue should atterlpt

it.

A

president rnay only w'in a handtirl of changes while in ofllce, and refbrnr takes dedication and a

commitment to the cause. Passion rnust be at the heart of the matter.
Speed is the second lesson they oflbr, meaning a plan should be submitted fbr

consideration as quickly as possible. Based on history. the closer the presider-rt proposes a plan
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to tlte tirst day in ofllce. the greatcr thc likelihood 1br successfirl adoption. In sonre instances.
presicients get a second chitnce later in their"terrl

given the electiotr
l-ras

1-rroccss

if

otl-rer big events have taken precedencc. but

and lirnits on the terrrs that can be served. the best chance a presidcnt

to pass arry kincl of nririor lcgisliition is early' in thc terrn.

While irrtrodr"rcitrg a plarr earll'or-r is a key to

sr,rccess,

equally irrrportant is that a president

brings a plan to tl-re oflrce. ""I'he White I Iouse is rro place tbr scherr-ring up health refbrnr
legislatior"r'" (Blumenthal

& Morone. 2009. p. 112). This

lesson suggests that work should begin

well befbre taking otfrce so that no tinre is wasted once a president is sworn in. In addition. this
allows

tl-re presiderrt"s visiot-t

and intention fbr retbrm to be clear, and sets the president and

public's expectations surrouncling thc issue.
Econotlics

hets arlu'ays lreert a

big part o['the concern within health care retorrn.

as

expanding coveragc ncver llts anl' lrucl-uct. Successlirl refbrm is achieved when a presiderrt is
able to htrsl-r the ecittronrists. thc tburth lcssori when attempting refbrrn. Budget drives a big part

of the l-realtlr ceu'e con\/crsatiorr. itncl cconomists are concerned with outlining the risl<s involved
w'ith any plan.

-l'he

authors suggcst that. "presidents who seek to expand health coverage need to

flnd the sell'-corrtldcnce to overrule thcil clisnral scientists and plunge ahead" (Blurrrenthal &
Morone, 2009. p. 41.1).
One way a president calr gain that sel[confldence is by showing that he has the support

of the people. which leads to tlte inrporteurce o1'the next lesson-goingpublic. A president,ul,ho
is serious about healtl-r care must nrake it a priority on the campaign trail, and share a vision that
resonates with and inspires people to support
callse once in

it. 'fhe president

oflce by commutricating the vision

mnst continue to campaign fbr the

and ideas within the plan to the public, why

the issue is of such great inrportance and how the issue is relevant to thern. Meclianow of-fers the
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opportunity to cotlrect'ur,'itlt the putrlic 24 hours a cla1 . allowing the presicletrt plentv of
opportunities to get in liont of the public to coumLlnicatc the niessage.
Lesson six discr-rsses the recluirernent of'tlre plesiclent to tre able to manage Congress.
Ours is one of the most cornplex political systerls and "'the successful president must be nimble
at rnaking our convoluted legislative process wol'k'" (Blurlenthal & Morone, 2009, p. a16). Past
presidents who experienced success are serid to have l"reen able to build relationships across party
lines, employ talented legislative teeutts to serve as liaisons ancl nrarneLrver the system on the
president's behalf-. They were Lrnconcernecl with getting the credit. publicly gave credit to others.
and were present when they needed to be.

As the next lesson, Blumenthal and Morone recor-nr-nencl that a president forget the
PSROs. or Profbssional Stzrndard Revierv Orgarrizations. These grolrps were set

r"rp

to monitor

health insurance programs. Ireanirt-rr thev arc ingrairrccl in thc nrinute details of plar-rs.

Blumenthal and Morone (2009) use this phlase as a nreans to irrply that the presiderrt should not
get bogged down in details or day-to-day managemerrt of.thc plan. They sr"rggest that the

president should say fbcused on the big picture. the national debate or the Congressional process.
Related to managing Congress, one cern do this by nraking sure the right people are

ir-r

place to

help delegate the work that needs to be done.
The flnal lesson states tl-rat a presiderrt shoulcl learn how to lose. Many have tried and fbw
have succeeded in passing health care retbrrn. llven in losing. there are lessons to be learned that
can assist in setting the tone tbr flrture conversations and plans. In health care. more ef1brts have
been lost than won, so Blurnenthal and Morone (2009) suggest that the president should prepare

fbr this fate but should also respect that even a loss will shape the future of the issue.
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eight lessons

-

passion. speed. bLinging a plan. hushing the econonrists" going

public. nranaging Congress. lbrgetting the PSROs. and learning to lose

-

provide a tinrelv.

relevant and appropriate fiamelvork fion-r which to evaluate Obanra s leadership in the passir-rg

ol

recent health cale refbrur. What was it abor-rt this particular tinre and place that allowed refbrrn

to come to tiuition? How did President Obarna fare within the fi'anrerl'ork presented by
Blumenthal and Morone, and what additional other lessons nright he lcarned?
Analysis of President Obama's Leadersl-rip ol'Hcalth Carc Rcform
Many presidents have tried but fbw have succeeded irr gerrerarling such sweeping health
care

re

Iorm as President Obarna. when, under his watch. histrlric legislation was perssed.

Irollowing is an overview of the events that led to the passing ol-the Putiurl Protection und
A/fbt'cluhle C'ure Act, as well as ar"l analysis of Presidcnt Olranra's leadership u,ithin

t]-re

context

of

presidential leadership previor"rsly described eurd thc eight lessons sLl-sgcstecl b1, Blunrenthal and
Mororre.
Rc./brm E.//irt.s (Jntler Pre.yiclent ()bumu

Similar to Presiclent Clinton, Obama begar-r his health care crusarcle on the presidential
carnpaign

trail. He pledged to curb rising health care costs.

cncl ahusive practices by private

itrsurers. and expatrd insurance coverage to uninsured Arnericans

(L)unham.20l0). Anotherpart

of his campaign plattbrm was the promise to reach across party lines
*uround

arnd

try'to flnd comlrron

atlongst lawmakers in Washington. President Obanra"s (2008) vision. in his own words:
Sign into law a health care plan that gr-rarantees aflbrdable. quality insr"rrance tbr every

American who wants it; brings down premiums fbr every family who currently has
coverage; boosts quality; requires coverage of preventative czlre; reduces the price

of
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prescription

clrr-rgs: ernd

stops insurancc companies f}om deny'ing coverage basccl orr

preexisting conditiorrs. (p. I9)
Llpon etrterit-t-e ofljce. Presiderrt Obarla fbund hinrsell'with a high approval rating arrd

high expectatiorrs liont tlre t,oters who elected hirn into of1lce (SteinhaLlser" 2009). I-lc also
fbr-rnd the country in the biggest recession since the Great Depression.

in the rnidst of'tw'o

r,r,'ars

in

Iraq and Afghanistarn. and n,ith the highest unemployment rates in decades. With all olthe othcr
issues tacing the country artd the aclrlinistration. Obarna's advisors f'eared pr-rshing liealth cale

would be bad fbr the systenr ancl put hinr at risk fbr future political def-eat. President Obar-na
elected to tnake health crlre his clonrestic priority because he thought tl-rat the current state of
-il-re
health care was linancially urrsustainable.
barrd-aid approach of past ef forts cor-rlcl not tlx the
j

system

-

structural changcs \ver"e reclr-rircd. I-le understood that it r,vould be an uphill battle anrl he

Irad no expectittiotts that he r,roulcl u'in cver"yone over in the process. br-rt he trelievecl it r.las the

right thing to clo (Alter.2010). In a specch befbre
Oban-ra tolci Con-srcss

a

joint

session in February 2009. President

"neiirlr a ccr-rtur1'afier Teddy Roosevelt called fbr relbrnt. thc cost ol-our

l-realth care llzrs w'eighecl dorvn i)Llr econonry and the conscience

of our nation long enough.

So

let there be no cloubt: Health care refbrnr cannot wait. it must not wait. and it will not wait
another

year (para. 57).
Presiclent Obanta face'd a tumultlroLls road paralleled to that of history in his quest tbr

refbrm. Sinrilar to the perioc'licity olhealth care throughout history,he experienced setbacks
along the way. Shortly' alier he took oftlce" Obama faced his flrst of many when the person he
had enlisted to spearhead this ef1brt. Senate
and human services secretary atier

Majority leader Tom Daschle. withdreu,

as the health

it was discovered that he was late in paying his income taxes.

'['o tnany, this signarlecl politics as nsual in the White House
as opposed to the change he

Obanra"s Ilealth

f'arc Rctirrnr

37

pronrised during his carnpaign. It also addccl a lavcr ol'conrplexit-v* irr stafflng the White IIouse
as vetting. or background checks.

becalle like airport securit\'. Anv potential stat'l'nrenrber

being considered lor a.iob within the rarnks of'the White House now faced an evelr rrore

rigorous, thorongh and time cor-rsunring background check to save the adrninistration the sarre
embarrassment of previor-rs appointrlents. "l-he Obarra admirristration. like those befbre it,

didn't dare rein in the process fbr fbar of seenrin-u ethically challenged or insr-rtflciently aware of
the political costs ot'hurniliating publicity"' (Alter. 2010" p.

l2l).

President Obama lauuched refbnn eflirrts with a White Flor,rse tbrurl in March of 2009
and inclr,rded a cross-section ol indr-rstry. Congressional. nnion and think tank experts. Durirrg

this fbrum he announced his intention to pass a plan by the end of 2009 as w,ell as his expectation
tl-rat Congress

work together to deliver a plan try Auglrst. While Obanra put Health Care on the

list of dorrrestic priorities. hc could rrot clo thc r,r'urk hiurself and he looked to Speaker of the
House, Nancy Pelosi. and Senate Ma.jorit-r' [-caclcr. FIarry Reicl to lead the charge. The two
wor-rld become synonynrolls rvith

rcfbnl ancl iustrunrcnti,rl in shaping and championing the isslle.

Town-hall style treetings were set-lrp fbr citizerrs to nreet with local representatives in Congress
thror-rghout the country and nrany Anrericans tunred up to show their displeasure with the

proposed changes to health care. 't'he biggest issues tiom opponents. as has been consistent
througl-rout l-ristory. ranged fl'orrr concerns over the proposed public option. to governrnent

involvement and regulation. to loss olbenetlts arrd changes to current plans (Dur-rham.20l0).
Sirnilar to President Clinton. Obama had the best ol interrtions. Perhaps learning fiom his
predecessor, he attempted to put the right people in charge, to brirrg people together to discr-rss

the issr-res in a public fbrmat, to get the input fiom Congressional leaders across party lines, and

to create a plan that incorporated the input and Llpou which all could agree. However, opponents

OLrarrna's

ancl

their allies hacl dilf-erent plar-rs. Thev

hard

Ilealth Care Relontt 3tt

no irttcntiot"t ol'w'orking n,ith Otranra or his

adnrinistrzrtion because a win on health care or anv issue tbr that nratter signaled the strerrgth ol'
his ancl the Dernocratic Party's position. Opponcnts clicl a better.iob ol-corlmunicating their

point olview with the public and in doing so cor.rlirsed and dilutecl Olranra's (l-11,'nes.2010).
Corrgress was r-rnable to deliver a plarn h1, August. and in Septerlber. PresicJer-rt Obama
restated his intentions to tackle health care relbrnr and his erpectations of Congress to deliver a

plarr. ln November and December of 2009. Prcsiclent Obama saw refbrrn take its flrst small steps
when both the House and the Senate passed initial bills. albeit.iust lrarely with 220-215 and 6039 votes respectively. While initizrlly a part of Obama's vision. only thc House bill contained a

public option. T'he hope was to merge the two bills and sencl along to Obanra fbr approval, but in
.lanuary 2010 refbrm eflbrts received a blorv vr,'hcn Massachusetts Republican Scott Browr"r won
the special Senate election. replacing Democrat'l-ecl Kcnnedl r,r,ho hacl passerl erway and had
cledictrted his litb to working on healtl-r care issr"rcs.

'l'hc

Scnate no lor.r,eer had the votes they

needed to get past a fllibuster and refbrnr eflirrts \\erc put orr holcl ([)unhanr.2010).
Sonre saw the election as a sign that the voting public clid not want hearlth care refbnn to be a

priority, but Obarna, with encollragernent fl'orr Pclosi. continucd pushing tbr health care refbrm.
"According to published reports. when President Obanra was conternplarting a contpromise with
Repr-rblicans. and White House Chief

of Statf Rahrl Erlanuel and Senate Majority Leader Harry

tteid (D-Nev.) w'ere advocating a less-ermbitious urcasure (,uvhich Pelosi derided as "kiddiecare,") she persuaded thern to stick with an orrnibr"rs
expressed her fiustration with the president as

bill" (Bzdek.2010, para. 8).

tilr months.

Pelosi

slre and Senator Reid had worked

diligently on President Obama's Iegislative priority, putting their names. relationships and
potentially their political careers on the line. and Pelosi wanted afflrmation that the president was
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in the light n,ith thenr. In addition. Obama had not yet statecl publicll vrhat he u,'ar.rted to see in
health care bill and on this point she challerrged the president. ('ongressiorral leacJers wanted

know u,here lrc stood on the issue and the lack of clarity onlv
rrruclr ntore

ln

r-nacle

a

tcr

Pelosi arrd I{eid's rvork that

ditflcult (Hulse. Stolberg & Zeleny.20l 0).

Februarry 2010. one

yearatiertaking ofllce, Obaura

helcl a bipartisan healthcare

slrrnmit to discLrss moving tbrward with comprehensive healtlr care reforrl (l'}elosi.2010). The

surnmit is said to be the flrst of its kind in the memory of most legislertors ("Derlocrats
considet'." 2010). Pelosi and Democratic leaders were skeptical. but the sumrlit marked the

turning point in the debate, as it showed Obama reaching out to Republicerns. tbrced the
Republicans to put their ideas on the table, and ultirnately put the debate back on the national
agerrda (Hulse. Stolberg

&.Zeleny.20l0). It was televised on CSPAI\. where hcated

excltalt-{es could be witnessed between the president and opponerrts ol-the

debarte and

plan. At the sante

tinte. Detttocrtttic leaders. Pelosi and Reid in particular. relincprished the idea o1'appezrsing
Itepublicans ancl itrstead focused on moving ltrrward with a plarr ol'w,hich a nrafority'of the
Denrocratic Party cor-rld agree ("Democrats consider,"

20l0).

Obama then released his ow'n plan.

which was br-rilt on the Senate version of the plan and convincccl wavering Denrocrats that a loss
on this issue woLrld be amzrjorsetbackto theparty in terms of being ablc to accomplish other

priorities. sttch as.jobs and immigration, as well as potential ranriflcations in upcoming mid-term
electiorrs. Therefbre, Democrats who did not initially support President Obarra's vision
eventually did so in the end to help strengthen both his authority and the party's position.
On March I B, 2010, House Democrats unveiled legislation to irnprove the Senate-passed

bill to aclrieve three key goals, including "aflbrdability fbr the middle

class. accessibility fbr all

Americans. and accountability forthe insurance indr-rstry" (Pelosi.2010). Three days later. the
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I-lrrr-rse passed

-+0

the Sertate version and ort Marclt 23.2010. OLrama sigrred the Pulicnt Protct'tiou

urut .l//orduhlc ('ut'c.{c'l into leru.

"...tliis retbrrr will

A

r,veek

afier the passing of the bill Obarna acknou,ledgetl.

rrot solve e\/cl')'problenr rvith ilur health care systenr. It

the cost of health care overnight.
represe nts enonnous

will

rrot bring clou'n

We'll have to nlnke sonre adjustrnents along the

progress (Lee. 2010. para.

21

). According

vva),. IJut it

to the White House"

"indepetrdent experts have fbr"rrrd thal the new law helps reduce costs fbr fanrilies and businesses.
cuts the deflcit ernd strengthens Medicare. adding years to the trust firnd while maintaining
seniors guaranteed beneflts. J'he Congressiorral Budget Ottlce, the government's lton-partisan
scorekeeper. said the Afllbrdablc'Care Act wolrld save over S100
and over'

$

A.y.t'e,s',s'irtg

I trillion in the fbllowing

billion ovcr the next ten

y,ears.

decade" (201 0).

Prt:,sidant Ohuntu',s' Lcutlcrs'hip in Re/brm Ef./ot't.r

Obatnra"s lcaclership clLrring the refbmr process has been nret

with nlixecl crnotirins.

Iteports rrflry on the clarity ancl pllrpose of his vision. his comrnunicatior-r with ('ongress
pLrblic. and his lcvel of participation in the process.

anc'l the

At the sante time. and as is consistent

vu,itlr

l-ristory. "health insurance... had no chance without vigorous White House leadership"

(Blumenthal & Morone.2009, p.

ll). I will assess Presider-rt Oban-ra's leadership r,v,ithin the

fiatnew'ork ol'eight lessons presented

Lry

Blumenthal and Morone, and. based on the lcarning

fi"orl his efforts. will otl'er additional lessons ltlr consideration.
President Obarr-ra w.as passionate about health care refbrrn. From an econonric stanclpoint.
he believed that the current systern was financially unsustainable. Politically. he knew it wor.rlc'l
be a challenge and potentially damaging to his career. Personally, he heard the powerfirl stories

of struggles fiorn citizens around the country and he promised to create change.

Ol-rarna's Hcaltli Carc

Rclilrnr 4l

While he was passionate abrxrt tlie isslre. there are slrggestiorrs tliat hc did a nrediocre -iob
of short'irrg it. This cannot tre attributcd to his l-celirrgs nhout the isslle. ltather. it is simply due to
his personal style. President Obanra is knou'n fbr his cool. calm. collected demeanor. which is
seen as positive under most circunrstances.

"'l'he presiclent... has shown f-ew.glintpses into his

inner decision-making process, but the irnage he presents to the country and to the world is one

of a calrl and steady leader who refirses to get bogged ciown in day-to*day skirmishes"
(Yor-rngrtan.2010, para. 3). This is sin-rilzrr to w'hat Greenstein (2010) ref-ereed to as emotional

intelligence. By his definition, enrotional intelli-uence

-

levelheadeclness

-

is of utmost

importance tbr a president and Obarna certainly fits this delrnition. '"Obama chooses to fbcr-rs on
the larger view and long-ternr picture n'hile delegatirrg his nngcr or outrzrge over daily partisan
and pr,urdit attacks
pelra. 10). When

to...White

Hor,rsc

clrielol-statf Rahnr Etlar-tr-rrl ancl others" (Youn-{rrau. 2010.

it came to talking ahout health care. holvcver'. nrany rnissed seeing sorne kind of

eruotion fiom Obarna. which helps the pLrblic relate to the prcsident. His ilrage has been
consistent throughout liis canlpilign and tinre in
fbcLrsed but a challenge

ol

cc. uhich is henefrcial lbr keeping his stafT

fbr the public looliirrg fbr sonrething tu rvhich they can relate.

President Obarna otrtlinecl lris

initial vision orr the canrpai,en trail and presented his

expectations to pass legislation within his trrst year in oftlcc-just afier his inauguration. Advisors
sttggested that he take up the issue later in liis temr, but he recognized that his best chance to

accomplish any kind of refbrnr \vas prior to the 2010 micl-term elections and with the support
a Democratic-controlled legislatr-rre. He was nof concerned

of

with passirrg the perf-ect plan; rather,

he believed the process had to start sorlewhere. In terms of the lesson

ol speed, President

Obama was quick to make health care relbrm a domestic priority and began conversations with
Congress and the public immediately.

Ot-ranra's

Ilcalth Carc ftelurrl

12

'l'he presidenl expressed his vision earrly
on cluring the carnpaign trail. set the tone lbr Iris
acir-ninistration on a platfbrm fbr change and outlir-recl his expcctations

tt.r pass

refbrnr to

f'ongress. His plan was to set the fl'amework and then illlor,r the parrties to work together to
create the best plan fbr the country. This w'as deliberate and aligned r,r,'ith health rcfbrni activists

who expressed that "the only way to win this timc was to stav vague. defbr to Corrgress. and buy

off the powerfirl interest grolrps...that sank refbmr in lt)94" (Alter.2010" p.251). President
Obama campaigned on the promise of changing Washinglon and believed in the power of

lrrirrging people together to f-rnd comrnon ground. In theory this w'as idcal. but irr practice this
proved to be a much bigger challenge than he anticipated.
l-Jnfbrtunately, Congress

\A,as

not able to work togethcr trs he had hoped. Republicans

deliberately refr.rsed to work together with neither Presiclcnt Obanra nor f)ernocratic leaders. and
tlrcy'challcnged him by clairning that he was not fbcused on the right isslrcs (such as-iob
creatiotr). irrstilling f-ear that he was tryirrg to create a socialist svstenr. ancl bv highlighting that
even his ovrn party could not get aligned on the issue. u,'hich irr nranv \\avs rvas true. Opponents'

prirtrary concern was to def-eat Obama. wl-rich signalecl sorlething largcr thern the issue of health

care. Def-eating refbrm would call Obama's leadership
r,tsed

ar-rcl

power into cluestion. and opponents

every tactic in their powerto fiustrate refbrnr. fronr rlobilizing protesters. to crashing the

town hall fbrr-uns, to threatening those within their own party who corrsiderecl supporting the
president's agenda. Those who chose to support the president risked political scrutiny, which

Iray have tr"rture implications on an official's ability to get reelected.
Detlocrats struggled within their own party dr-re to a variety of reasons such as difl'ering
opinions on the best approach, how to work with Republicans, ancl how to pay fbr

it. Some

Democrats expressed the need fbr a greater presence fiom President Obama in the process than
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he irritially shou,ed. artcl sorne \\iere concerned that the RepLrblicarr upset in thc special clcctiorr

was a sign

fiorl vr>ters that other

issltes were of gr"eater irnportance ("Denrocrats Cor-rsicler."

2010). In his attenrpt [o leave power in the hands of Congress and his belielthat people rvorking
together will create the trost acceptable plan. his ar-rthority wers r-rltirnatel,v called into qr-rcstion
and perception was such that Otrarna was not able to manage the systenr.

Consistent with this theme is a poll fi"om Gallup (2009) that reportecl Anrericans had lost
sol.ne confldence in his

ahility to nranage the governrnent effectively. Near the 100-day

rtrar"l<

ol'

lris presidencl'. 660A of Americans believed he was eflectively marragirrg tlte governrtrerrt. That
declined to

5L)o/o

in.luly and 55o/oin

Septen-rber

(Gallup,2009). On a positivc fiont. the poll also

reported that. althougl-r Oban"ra rnay have failed to achieve much bipartisan agrccntent on

policies.
w'ere

(r0%n

nrei-ior'

of'Anrericans gave him credit tbrtrying. In addition. it shor,vecl that Anrcricatrs

tlttch less likely to believe mcmbers of Congress oleither party \,vel'c [l'r,in-, [o r"r'ork

together. Only'33o/o said the Republicans and 38% said Democrats \vere rlaking a sinccrc ellilrt.
Rcsults are bascd on telephone interviews with 1.030 national erdults. aged I tl ancl olcler'.
conducted Septerlber 1l and September 13,2009. The margin of sarrrplirrg errcr'is +4
percentage poirrts. Interviews were conducted with respondents on letndline teletrlhones

(lbr

respclndents w'ith a land-line telephone) ancl cellular phones (fbr respondcnts who are cell-phone

only). It was not r-rntil he restated his intentions to pass refbrm in Septernher 200i). relinquished
his rreed to herve bi-partisan sllpport, released his own plan in Februar.v 2010 rvhich rrol'e clearly
stated his expectations and once again shared stories of everyday Arnericerns who strr-rggled
because

ol

issr-res

related to health care as he had on the carnpaign trail that thc president frnally

saw traction and the eventual passing of refbrm.
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E,conomics were a prinrar')' rearson that Presiclent Obama lrelicved the L]nited States
needed refbrnr. and a l'cason hc was passionate abor"rt change. As was previor"rsly statecl. hezilth
cal'e expenditlrres in tlre LJnited States surpassed $2.3

trilliou in 2008. The average resident spent

$7,681 per person and health care accor-nrted lbr 16.zoh ol'the nation's Gross Don-restic Product

(GDP) (Health Aftairs.20l0: Kaiser Fanrily Foundation. ?010. lJ.S. Departrnent o1'Health and
Human Services, 2010). Ilresiclent Obama created the case to the economists that refbnl could
help manage the budget by redr,rcing costs paid by consunrers and the government long ternr.
The president outlinccl his ir-rtention that refbrnrs wor"rld be irnplemented over time and the tlnal

bill that was passed will supposedly

sa\ic $100

million over the next ten years and over $1

trillion in the fbllou,ing decade. This ciid not stop opponents fiom touting the proposed price tag
and fiom clairling that retbrnr rvor-rld increase costs to taxpayers" reduce the quality and place
unwanted regulations on tlteir care. but Obanrzl \,as able to nrake the case to the decision nraliers
that this woulcl benefrt the cor.rrrtr\,'c flnarrcials long-terrn.

Building support fbr a policv rvith the public is a maior requirement of refbnr. and going
public is one way to do tlrat. Blumenthal and Morone (2009) suggest that communication ntust
come fl'orn the presider-rt himself directly to the people. They argLre that in order to win support.
the president rnust serve as the face olrefbrm and must instill the vision while showing how it is
relevant and manageable. As Denton (2005) states, "(i) t isn't accomplishments that rlark a
president as a sllccess or f ailure. br-rt how that president's message is communicated and lrow it is
perceived by the American people" (p.

52). President Obama outlined his vision

Ibr refbrn-r

early on and inspired initial support fbr the plan in the rhetorical sense. Once in ofIce. he was
clear that he considered it a domestic priority and was clear about the timefiame by which he
expected plans to take fbrm; however, he was not able to rnaintain the momentum he

Obania's llcaltli f'arc Rclirnrr 45
experienced on the cernrparign treril. Prcsident Otranra was not able to articulate tlic reason fbr the

refbrm in a way that conncctccl rvith people to rnake thcnr urrderstancl r,r'irv it r,vas inrportant.
j

when nrany Anrericzrns saw issues such as-lotr creation as L-reing of higher priority. [-le also was

not able to help the public r,rnderstancl hurn, spencling today on refilrrn wor-rld save nroney in the
long run. The administration chose to talk to the llublic about health care in terr-ns nf poti.y un.f
change, but without a personal connection to the issue. the public had a dif1lcult tin-re grasping it.

As is apparent throughor-rt the history olhealth czrre. it is a complex issue arrd the best way to
break thror"rgh a cornplicated issue is to show'how it is relevant. Late in the debate, President
Obarna went back to telling stories of ever)'day' Anrericans who struggled with issues related to

the health care system as he ltard done in the earlS,,clays on lhe canrpaign trail. but it w'as a little

too late to see widespread pLrblic support

- particulnrll'r,r'hen the opposition had treetr so vocal.

One lesson that President Obanra lirlloucil w'ell u,as r.rot til get bogged down

ir-r

of a plan and instead stick to tlie big picture. 'l'his entzrils rnakir-rg slrre the right people
place to lead the charge

the details
erre

put in

. Nancy Pelosi in particular rvas a nralor clriving fbrce in the passing

o1'

health care refbnn. In a.Ianuar\')B press conference. Pelosi (2010) stated "(u,)e w'ill go through
the gate. [f the gate is closed. rve will go over the t'ence.

lf thc ltnce

is too high. w'e will pole

vault in. If that doesn't work. wc will paracl-rr-rte in. But we are going to get health refbrm passed"
(Speaker Nancy Pelosi online). She was the ideal candiclate as her style rnirrors the approach
Obama said he wanted to see used in Washington

-

that of listenir-rg. talking about the issues,

and working together to accomplish goals. Retbrm advocates consider her a hero in the health
care crusade as she worked tirelessly to pass relbrm. her vote-gatlrering and coalition-building

skills cited specifically in why refbrrn was possible. The president also surrounded himself with
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stal'f'that. everr u,hen thev did not agree rvith the initial clecision to tackle health care. trusted
sr-rpportecl the presiderrt and workec'l diligentl_v

-l(r

ernd

to ensure that lris vision bcclin"lc realitl'.

l'he tlnal lesson. learning to lose. is one that President Otranra knew'\\'as a possibility and
the ratlifrcations of Iosing wor.rlci be great.

if legislation did not happcn inlnrecliatell, that it

would be a considerable amount of tin-re befbre the debate could evcr start again. Another
drivirrg factor also nray have been Obama's relationship with Senator I'cd Kcnnedy r.n,ho fbught

diligently fbr refbnn throughout lris entire career. Kerrnecly

w,as a nrentur

to Ofro,r',ar ll'otn the

tirnc he flrst entered the Senate, and Obama considered the day Kennedy endorscd him fbr
presidenl

ats

one of the best days

olhis lif-e (Smith & Martirr.2009). Ilis

personarl

conrnritrlent to

Setrator Kennedy's work added a human element to his determination to sec rcfbrrtr throLrgh. As
merrtioned" the prcsident was rtot concernecl with passing a pcrf-ect

bills

eu'e

updated artd reworked over

bill and hc uncler"stood that

tinre. IIis primary conccnrs to cur'b rising health cltre costs.

ettd abusive practices by private insurers. and expand insr-rrancc co\/erage to unir-rsurecl

Attrericans appearto have been met with the bill. arrd tirne vrill tell

ilthe irriplcnientatiun hasthe

desired efl-ect. Both the successes and setbacks fionr the past year can he revielved and r.l'ill set
f

utr"rre

refbrnr conversati ons.
Blunrentlral and Morone (2009) oftered an interesting and relevarnt lcrrs tlrrou-uh which to

view President Obama's leadership. and the president and his adrninistration \\,ere the first to
have attetnpted refbrrn since these lessons were off'ered. Evaluatin-u Presicleut Obernta

s

leadership within tl-ris fiarrtework, he receives high marks fbr specd. bringing a plan, hushing the
econotnists, leading at a high level and putting the right people irr place: firred well w'ith passion
and learning to lose; and lefi some roonr for irnprovement in terms of lrow managing Congress
and going pLrblic.
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In reviewing the events of the past year in the context of their lessons. therc arc n l.erv
additional lessons that nri-uht also be consiclered fbr an adnrinistration attempting refbt'nr. such

as

creating tlre right inrage. bringing people together. nraintaining a sense of pr-rrpose and rcnraining
ar-rtl-rerrtic.

'['he public has unusually high expectations of a president, and a president's inrage plays
an extretr"rely itlportarrt role in how an issue is perceived and even the eventual or-rtcontc. As wets

explained. a presidcnt's role ntust change and evolve clepending on the issue at hand. ancl a
president nrust ttnderstand w'hart type olleadership is required fbrthat particr"rlar point in tinte.

As was described within []lr-rrlenthal and Morone's lesson olgoing public. the president rlust
serve as the firce of thc issr-re. but eclually important is the need to understand what farce is

required. Within rccent presiclencies. inrage is everything and understanding what inrnge. in
addition to wltat lritnagenrent st1,'le. is required will allow a president to get through tcl the pulrlic.
For exatlple . Ilresiclettt Obanra knew that his message was not breaking through to the public.
Part ol'that rvas his cool ancl collectecl leardership style; part was that tlre ntessage

raras trot

personal or relevant: part of it was opponents had a consistent, unitled rnessage. Wherr he sall'

this was happerring" the comnrllnication strategy shitted to one of storytelling that hacl bcen so
cornpelling on the canrpaign trail. A leader"shor-rld understand what image

errrd

style is rcquired

when atternpting create change.

Bringing people togetlrer is becoming more and rnore ir-nportant. President Obama
strongly believed in this notion and campaigned on this idea being a platfbrm fbr change in
Washington, w'hich Americans appeared to have appreciated when they elected hirn into ofllce.
The previot-ts administration, led by George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, had

greatly expanded the president's power during their eight years in ot1lce (Stevenson. 2005). The
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adrlinistratior"r becanre knor,r'n fbr its authuritarian st1'le and fbr nraking clecisions in a silo. ancl
the Atlerican public artci Iawrriakers alike camc,o Or.rt,on the authority olthe presidency.

Voters had grown werlrv ol'wurn-oLrt politics

erncl

he inspired hotrre that leadership could be

dilferent.
As with each president before hin-r. Presiclent Obanra came to the White
ditterent approach. He would lead

by,'

Flor-rse

with

a

Iistening. attenrpt to reacl-r across Party lirres. and. learning

fionr mistakes olprevior"rs aclministrations' closed-door policies. he comrnitted to leacling

a

transparent administratiot-t. Ilresiclent Oberrna applied this approach in the beginning of health
care refbrrn. He laid out a vision firr the plan but

leti it to Congress to work through the details

together. He set r"rp bi-partisan slunn-rits fbr lawnrakers and town-hall fbruurs fbr the American
public to have inpLrt and to voice tlrcir opinior-rs. Hc invited social rnedia fbllow.ers to sharc
personal storics o1'why'health care

important

1o

rlake people

-

relilrrl nrattered through email and Facebool<. It wers

his stall. lawrlakers. and the American public

-

leel as if their

voices were being heard. Despitc oppolrcnts" resistance. President Obarla is given credit fbr

trying to bring people together to corle up w'ith the best plar-r. The presider-rt must recognize if
and when the process is not r,vorking and havc the courage to ntove fbrw'ard withor-rt those who

might not be on board. but. like thc lesson of learning to lose. brirrging people together to work
and have crucial conversations provides the opportunity to learn fl'om one another. to potentially

flnd better solutions. and to beconrc aligned on the issues.
Setting a vision is an extrenrell, important part of any refbrrn, but rnaintaining a sense of
purpose thror-rghout tl-re process is eclr-rally important. Purpose helps provide clarity fbr the issue.
For those debating refbrrn within Congress, it helps fiame the issr-re in a way that shows how it is
relevant to the country and constituents" and fbr those in the general pr.rblic, it helps provide the
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palticulzrr issue is irnportant to aclclress. It is saicl that Presiclent Obarna begins

his workdal'by readirrg letters rvritten to

hirl lrv evcrrclav Anrcricans espressing their thoughts.

hopes. issues and concerns. These lettels are saicl to har,'c hclped liinr stay connected to the issue
and the reason to continue pushing fbr

refbnn. l\4aintaining

i-r

scnse ol-pr,rrpose also helps ensLtre

the passion fbr the issLre stays alive.

The tinal additional lesson is remaining authentic. Presidentiatl power is created and
shaped by public expectations and perceptiorr. ancJ those expectations stenr fr"om a president's
irlerge and character. As discussed. a rla-jority' ol'Americans tend to carc ntore about character

than issues. People lrave a need to feel that thel' r-rnderstand tl-rc type of person a president is and
understands what is important to tlrenr. I-lverr cluring the heat of refbrrn eflorls, Obama

that

l-re

still

scorecl high tnarks

with voters ort character. Iror"eranrplc. thc Gallup poll previously

clescribed stated that640/o t'elt that Presiclent Obarra unclcrstiinds the problems Anrericans fhce in

their daily lives. Gallr,rp (2009) reported that no lcss than sixtt,-three percent of Arnericans have
said this about the presider-rt since thc'charactcristic uas llrst rlcasured in March
concludecl that 72% Ieel that Obama is

2008. It also

n'illing to nrzrkc hard dccisions and 66% believe hirn to be

a strong and decisive leader. President Obama renrerinccl aLrthentic throughout the process and

even those who do not agree with his policies ur cluubt liis ability'to rnanage the system have

rarely questioned his character. He attempted to reach across party lines yet when people were
not willing to cooperate, he electecl to renrain true 1o lris visior-r- true to his word and true to

hirnself in the process. Authenticity is an inrportarrt lessor-r. as an ar-rthentic leaderwill remain
respected leader long afier the dust has settled.

a
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In-rplications fbr Leading Clrangc

Only zl4 people have served as president of the L.lnitecl States. ancl Iess than a third ot
those chose to or were fbrced to address heerlth care

relbnr.

lrr-rt

their erpcrierice ol'l'ers lessons

tilr leailers of all levels. particularly those striving to create organizational change.
outlir-recl by Blumenthal and Morone (2009) and additional lessons glearlecl

fiorl

Lessons

Presiclent

Obama's eflbrts within health care refbrm offbr solid advice fbr how to approach and irnplerlent
change.
Passion is the first key to success, as passion shows that a leader cares. [rnrployees mnst

believe tlrat the issue at hand ntatters, and a leader who is passionate aboLrt

er

vision will be better

ahle to generate supporl fbr change. Passion can be shown in dif'ferent \\avs. hut a leader nrust
show that he or she has a vested interest in and cares about the outconre.

Within health care. the longer the issue is discussecl. the less liltely' it is that the proposed
cltanges

within a bill will actually pass. The same might be saicl within thc r.vorkplace. When

cltalt-ue is proposed. the longer people discuss the change the nrorc reasons people can

a

flnd not to

chartge. All change comes with a level olrisk and speed is of irnportance. Implernentation of the
change l-nay take more tirne, br-rt the decision and steps to irrstitute the change slrould be

r"r"rade

withor-rt delay.
Orre way to generate support

fbr chernge is by getting

ir-rpr"rt.

A leader

shoLrld attenrpt to

hring people together to have irnportant conversations and to nrake people f-eel that their input is
valr-rable. At the same time a leader needs to be able to make decisions necessary to fflove his or
her goals

fbrward. President Obama came to ofJ-rce on a platfbrrn of change. with

the

understanding that he would engage all members of Congress regardless of political party or

afllliation. and under the assumption that members would be open to working together.
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Urrfbrtunatell'. that was not the casc and as a result o1'Congressional leaders' inability'to work
togetlrer. Obarrra lost r,'alr-rable tintc

arncl

rnonrenturl on health care relbnn. I lowever'. oncc he

saw his initial plan w'as not working. he charrrged colrrse. Itecognizing this earlier in the process
when opponents were obviousll'stitlling the convelsation nray have rrade a difl'erence in

maintaining the desired

rt"tontetttr-rr-r-r.

The learrrirrg fl'om this is to continne to bring people

together but be able to identify a poirrt in time or a circunrstance in which a leader recognizes it
is tirne to move on regardless ol'input. Gctting input yet knowing when to nrove on

will

help

leaders of organizations ensLrre the change they seek is not stalled.

Similarly. both his arrd the adrlinistration's inability to initially rnanage Congress

imrlobilized President Olrartra. 'l'he same immobilization is ofien experienced when managing
organization. A leader

slrclr-rlcl

ern

undcrstand the internal proccss and structure and enslll'e the right

people are in placc to help r-nilnrlge the process. In ternrs ol-process. President Obama's ,n,isiorr

tbr rcfbnl encolrraged a hipartisrln approach arrd hc hopcd that the plarr that was clelivered vuould
encornpass input ancl agrectnent fi"orrt all sides. I-le underestirlated the rcsistance he rvould

experience tiorrt opponents whose prin-rary concern was not so much about the issuc of liealth
care refbrm. but morc so with the politics of ensuring that President Obarla w'as del'eatecl.

Obama coltnted on reaching bipartisan agreement and spent considerable time nnd energy
fbcused on getting agreenrent fiom those in Congress tJrat had no intentior-rs of helping ge1 a bill
passed. A leader in this instance rlust evaluate what it will take to accomplish a goal" have

crucial conversations and make difficult decisions if necessary, such as lettir-rg go olthe
bipartisan sLrpport

r-reed

ilthat is what is reqr-rired.

Cetting the right people in place is the next lesson that applies whether rnanaging
Congress or an organization. President Obama learrred early on that within the political arena

filr
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that the right person is evaluatecl be1'oncl-lust sl.,ills ur expcrience. A nunrber of President

Obatla's initial appointees nlay have hacl thc crcclcntials ancl sl<ills to nraneuver the systenl. but
actions in their personal lives called their integritl into clr"rcstior-r. Iror exarmple, Tonr Daschle

rvithdrew

zrs

the health and human services sccrctaru aficr it was discovered that he wers late in

payirrg his incorne taxes, anlong other allc'gatior-rs slrch as accepting gifts of travel and money.

Nancy Killdeer. who u,as set to becorne a new,l),crcatcd post olchielperfbrrlaltce officer. also

withdrew her name over unpaid taxes. Bill Richarclson

w,as Obanta's

tlrst choice fbr comrrrerce

secretary but withdrew during a grancl .iur),investi-rration into his potcr-rtially conupt relations

with a state contractor and financial contribr,rtor.
These instances caused pcople to qr-restirin Ol"ranrer ancl his adrninistration's credibility.

fbrced the adrrrinistration to add aclditiurral lar ers arrcl to the review process and closer scrutiny

potential candidates, and elirrrinatccl pilterrtiallr

-rtrci.ll

o1'

appointees over lesser issues. While

Obama likely was not persotrall.v involvecl in l"rackgrouncl checks on arppointees. these types ot
issues r-tltinrately retlect on his leadcrship. FortLrnatelr lirr hinr. he had leaders on his side
as Pelosi and Reid w.ho were able to nrarkc progrcss orr his

sr-rch

behalf. Lcaders in any organization

mttst be aware what kind of leaclership or nri-uragcrnent is reqr-rired fbr the particular point in tinre.
be aware

olany

issues that rnight hinc'lcr the

abilitl'to achieve the gozrl and rnake a hard decision

when time to move on.
Frotn the lesson of going public r.le nright clcrive that it is important fbr a leerder to serve
as the tace

of the change being proposed ancl to cornmllnicate open and honestly with

constituents. The langLlage used shor-rld nrake it relevant. so they are able to understand their role
and how the change or issue impacts thenr. Maintair, ing a sense of purpose throughor-rt the
process can help tiame the change. and stories or specific examples can help clarity the reasons.
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As u,'as seen within health care" thcre

atre lil<e11,n.ran)'clit-l'erent aucliences r,vho each

difterent approach orexplanation. A leader shoulcl bc ablc to clearll'conrrnunicate

u,ill rcrluire a
r.rsing

appropriate langr-rage fbr each auclience. At the sanre tirle. a leaderchor.,t.t creatc an image that
is appropriate to achieving the desirecl changc. A leader should evitluatc the envirn,.,,.,',.,',,- o,',0
tttrclerstar-rd

what level of management is required. and nraintain a consistent irnagc thror-rghor.rt

the process.

Every organization faces budget challenges and

zr

learder needs

to identify'how to make

sllre that tl-re cost of change does not become the reason nclt to chan-rre. A leader should
t-tnclerstand what

it takes to work with f-rnance or accountirrg departnrents iind use lernguagc that

will help describe lrow the change

can benefrt the organization

-

be

it increasecl production.

reduction in cost. or irnprovement in enrployee or custotner satislirction.
-fhe

best way to apply the lesson of learnirrg tcl losc f ur a lcader is to consider what

should happen afier tl-re fact should he or she not sr-rcceecl in creatirrg thc clesired changc. Farilure
provicles the opportr-rnity to learn ancl grow. and to rellne 1he approitch to achicve success the
next tinre around.

Finally, fiorn our lessons

w.e learn about the in-rportancc o1'rentaining

welnt a leaderthey can trust, one who

authentic. People

instills asense olvision and pLlrpose. and one who believes

in and stays true to a cause. An authentic leader will be respected rcgardless olthe outcolne,
powerfirl trait in the long

a

rr-rn.

Conclusion

For President Obarna and those befbre him. the health care road has been long. the

journey complicated and the arguments endlessly debated. Regardless of political afTlliation or
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bcliel. everluatir-rg Presiderrt Oharla's lcadership in reccnt hcalth carc relunn provides lessons liir
lirture relilrnrcr"s ancl leaders o1'all levels striving to create changc.
Ilresidcnt Obarna's attetnpt at refbrnr wils successfirl fbr a nurnber ol'reasorrs. [iirst olall.
hc hail a visiort fbr refirrm thzrt he clearly con-rmunicated and which resonated rvith thc pr-rblic in

tleaninglirl rvay tlrat initially led to his election. Once in of1lce.

he or-rtlirred his expectations

delivering a plan within his f rrst year in of1lce. The saune public that voted

fbr

Itirl into of-f icc

appeared to alter their opinion in terrns of what they thought his priorities slroulcl be but he
stayed true to the cause. as he believed that changing the cument systent was the only optiorr. At

the satnc time. he r,vats tlexible in ternrs of how the vision would heconrc realitv ancl nllou,ed it to
be shaped bl'those around
reqr-rir-cnre

hirn. In f-act. gathering input fionr all across

the boarcl a licl'

ut in building the plarr.

Prcsidcr-rt Obarla had support. From

driving lorces Nanc\, Pclosi and Ilan'1' Reicl. to ir

Dctlocraticallt'-c-ontrollcd Congress. to advisors such as Rhanr Enianucl anci Obarla's
N4ichclle. an-tutrg others. Obarna surrounded himself rvith people

w'i1-c.

uho nrit)'or lla),not ltave

initially'agreed with his plan but supported the president norretheless. Not without cluestion. but
respect

lirlly

so.

Presiclent Obama let go

olarry

f-ear

of losing the next election. I)olitical

so concerned about what nlay happen tomorrow that they lbrget w'hnt

lcaclers are ofien

it is they are sllpposed

doing and r,thom they are sllpposed to be servingtodzry. President Obarna kncw hc rlight never
see a second term regardless of-health care and was
happer-red deter

not going to let sorlethirrg that

l-rad

not yet

hinr fiorn keeping reform on the agenda. He also knew that the bcst chance of

passing some level of refbrrn was with a Democratically-controlled Congress in plarce. There
was no telling what would happen afier nrid-term elections and it could be years befbre any
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signifrcant relbrnr could be attenlplcd again. Olranra always f-elt that the systenr was rrot
sustairrable as

it existecl

ernci uars

cleternrined to create some kind of char-rge.

Presider-rt Obama's eflbrts were not perf-ect.

of which he is well aware. I Ie has bc'err

criticized lor not shorving more ernotion. fbr not being more involved in the process ancl lirr
having a general naivety' about the political clirlate in Washington in thinking people would be

willing to r,vork togcthcr. 'l'he truth is that he was passionate about the issue - no leader would
attenrpt slrch a l'eat w,ithout it

-

but his leadership style does not generally include expressing

overt emotion. In addition. his plarr ancl approach called for others to lead. to be engaged and to
provide input into the conversi-rtiorr. I Ie dicl not want to become the tace of refbrrl. wlrich is to
say, he watntecl others

witlrin the aclnrinistration and Congressional leaders to drive it. along with

input fionr those u'lro arc ser\/ed bl'ancl benefit frorn health care. When it was obvious that the
conversation was lreacling nou'hcrc. he coulcl liave w.alked away br-rt at the r-rrging ol'others Iikc
Pelosi. resolved his cornnritnrent ancl stel-rpecl into the role that was needed to see relbrrl through.
He shor.rld havc recosniz-crl the poinl at lr,'hich he needed to rethink his plan earlicr irr thc detratc.

but he eventually rccognized it. changed course and saw a version olhis vision beconre realitl'.
Another art:il vvhcrc Prcsident Obarna has been criticized but also praised n,as his
willingness to conrpr'orlise. f)hanra I'ne,uv the tlnal result wor-rld not be the perfbct plarn
perf-ect plan r,vas ttot f'easibly possitrle.

br-rt thzrt a

With so many vested interests, difJerences of opinion and

the broad spectrr-rm of issues that inllLrence healtl-r care, sorrre change was better thern no change.

Therefbre. a willingness to compronrise was required.

Finally. this time rvas dif't.erent because President Obarna had history on his side.
including the ability to learn tronr the last Democratic president's attempt at reform. Bill L'linton
was not able to accomplish health care refbrm during his tenure. Fortunately fbr Obama, he
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could revierv the last attc'r'npt and tarke concepts that u,'r-rrkcd u'ell

sr-rch as

thc idea of crcating a

lri-partisan grolrp to work to-r]ether or hosting torvr-r hall firrurls to gcnerate public interest. as rvell
as what did not

work rvell, such as the importance ol'having the right leadership in place arrd the

art of compromise. Hewas not the flrst norw'ill he be the last president to attempt significant

refbrnl, but past eflbrts are perhaps the best way to crezrte a tbotprint fbr firtr-rre endeavors.
The ink fionr President Obama's signature rlra)' lre dr1'on the Pulicttt Prolection unt{

A//brduble

(ur Act,but the work has_f ust begun and the firlure olhealth

care relbnn remains to

be seen. Politics, economics. cultr"rre. systenls. r,alues and deep-seeded belief-s

will continue

to

challenge presidents, administrations and the process olrefbrm fbr,vears to conre. but. in this
instance, President Obar-na showed courageous leaclership. IIe saw,that the cost of health care
was weighing down both the econonric and physical healtlr o1'tlre natiorr. IIe created a vision
ar-rd stayed

true to his word. He learrred fl'orrr past reftrrm atternpts and his own challenges. and

reflrred his approach along the wa,v in order to see it beconie realitt'. At the heart ol'health care

rcfbrm is a leader who simply believed
history.

ir-r

changc and in thc process changed the course of

57

[{e t'ercnccs

Altcr'..1. (1010). 'l lta prortti:a; l)r"r',ticlutl Ohunttt. r'aut'()na Ncri Yorl<: Sirrt)r'i ct
Slrrrstcr'.

Applcb)..1. (1008). (ancliclatcs divcrgc on hcalth carc plans. In ('. Mari

& I). Mc('al-licr'

(frcls.).'l'hc rafcrcnt'c .thal/: 'l'ha.4ntaric'urt ltrc,sidari.:t'(pp. 194-200). Neu'Yorl': l'hc

H.W. Wilson Corlpanr'.
[][r-tntcnthal. D. ct Moronc..f. (2009). Tlta ltcut't of prnrcr. l-{aultlt trutl politit't itt tltt'
ot,ul of/it'a. Los Angeles. CA: [Jniversity o1'('alikrrnia I]rcss.

L

Ilrrrr,rnlou''"

(19(r9). What \\'c cxpect the presiclcrrt to do. In t\. \\iilrlaisl.'r (l:.t|.).'l'lta

l'r'esitlt'nc.t' (pp.

&

[]Ltt'clen. I]."

i\4r-rgliein.

Ottcrrlt'r'1.1'.

('onrplur\

i5-43). Iloston: Little. Brcwn

arrcl

A. (1999). Public opirtion ancl

Ilillalr Itoclharn Clinton.l'ttblit'Oytirtion

.

(rj(2).237-250. ltetrievecl Novcnrbcr 13. ]01() lj'orn r\carlcrnic Scarch I)rcrlic'r

clatabasc.

llzcicl<. V. (2010). Whv

diil health care refbnr

pass'.)

Nartcl'l)elosi uils in chalsc.'l

lta

ll"ushirt.qlon Po.t'l Oulina. Retrieveci Sunclay'. NovcrnLrcr 13. 1010 fl'orn
http

cl

:

// u' lv

vn/c

o

r"r

Carttpion. F.l).

Itevieu

u

.

r,r'a s h i n g t o

tcn t/ar1

ic I

(l9tl4).

e/2 0

r-r

1

p o st .c o

0I

m/i.v p -

03 I 261,{ R 2 0 1 0 0 3

'l'he.11,1,4

2602225

.

h t nr I .

untl (J.,\. haulth Vtlit't',t'ittt't

l9l(). ['hicago. L'hicago

Prcss.

flanadian Meclical z\ssociatiorr Journal (2010).

L-f

. S. ckrctors diviclecl over health relbrnrs.

('unudiun itlcdit'ul A,v,t'ot'iuliort ,ktttt'nul. 1,Yl(3 ) 1 59- 1 60. Retricvecl Mav i 0. 201 0 1l'orl
http:/icrlaj.ca
Canadian Medicetl Association .lournal (2010). Hazards on the honiestr"etch in

5.q

Washin-utott's push to extend health care to rtrillions. (unudiun l4adit'ul

,,1^s'.s'ot'iution

,lotn'ttul, 182(3). 1-s5-15(r Retrieved May 30.2010 f}om http://cnrtri.ca
Canadian Meclical Association.lournal (2010). f)emocrats consider playing trump card in

effort to pass Obanra's health refirrms. Cunctdiun ltlec{icul Assot'iution .Jotrt'nul,

1<92(6).

261-262 Retrieved May 30. 2020 fiorn http:/cma.j.ca
Center fbr Medicare and Mec{icaid Services (2010). Medicare prescription dn-rg

itnprovetletrt and modernization act of 2003

.

Cenler"/or llletlicure unt{ lr,latlicuitl

Servit'e.s. f{etrieved.lune 11.2010 fl'orn https://www.cms.gov/mmaupdate/

Center fbr Rcsponsive Politics (2010). Lobbying database: top spenders. Opcnsct'rct"s'.rn'gl('entcr

.fbr Rc.s:gton.;it'c Polilit'.; onlinc. Retrieved November 1 3.2010 fiorn
http://wvu'Iw.opensccrcts.ot'g/lobby/clientsr-rm.php?lnarne:Pharmaceutical+Rsrch+%o26+M
ll's+o f +A nreri ca&year':20 1 0

Clintor-r. W. (1993). flaulfh s'actu'it1t; thc pr'esit{ent's'report to tha Arneric.uu ytcoplc. New York:
Sirlor-r

& Schuster.

Clyrner- A. (1994. October

3). I-{illary Clinton Says Adrninistration Was Misunclerstood

on

Health Carc. ,Var' \'ork Timc,v online. Retrieved Decernber 4. 2010 fl'onr
http://quer\'.n1'tinres.corn/gst/tullpage.htrnl?res:9FOCEFD61

73

DF93OAi 57 53C I A96295

8260&n:'l-opoA2F [tef-eren ceo/o2FTlmss*Topics%2FPeople%2FC%2FClinton%2C+Hilla
ry+Rod hanr&pagewan ted:al

Clymer, A

( 1 994.

I

November 10). The 1994 elections: congress to overview'; G.O.P. celebrates

its sweep to power'; Clinton vows to find colnmon ground. I,Jeu, I'ork 1-ime online.
December 4. 20 I 0 fiom http://www.nytimes.com/ l994ll 1 / I O/us 1|994-electionscongress-overv i ew- gop-ce lebrates- its-sweep-power-c l inton-vows. htrn l

59

Conrarou'. A. (2009). Alner"ica's best hearlth irrsurance plans: How the.v were ranked. {/S'

l/crr ttnt{ L'Vorltl Rcpot'l,s Ortlitrc. Rctrieved .lune

fl'orl

3" 2010

http://health.usnew's.corl/health-ne,ur,s/healtl-r-plarrs/articles/2009111/11/americas-besthea I th- i n s Lr ran c e- p I an

s-

how

-t

he y - w c re - ra n k e d. h tm

I

Denton.lr.. R. E. (2005). l\,'ktrul laucler.vltip uncl the .4mericun pre,s'idency. Lanharm. MD:
Rorvman

& Littlefleld Publishers.

Inc.

Dunham. W. (2010). 1'imeline: Milestones in Obama's qlrest fbr l-realthcare retbrm.
Reuters'

Online. Retrieved

.lr-rne B.

2010 fionr

http://www.reuters.com/arti cle/idU SN2 I I B2 7 5 l20l 003 22

Dwight D. Eisenhower Foundation (2000). Biography: Dwight D. Eisenhower. Dvright
D. Ei,ranhrnrer Fortntlulion. Retrievecl .lr.rne I I. 2010 lronr
lrttp //www. dwi ghtde
:

Eaton. J.

i se n

ho \\rer.

co

rl/b i odde.

htm l

& Pell. M.B. (2010). Lobbyists swanr thc capitol to intlr"rence health refbrrl.

Thc

('entar /itr I)uhlic Intagrit.t. Itetricved Novernber 13.2010 fl'om
http //wwr,v'. pub
:

Ii

cin

tegri ty. org/art

i

c

I

es/e

rr

try I 1 q

fi I

Eisenhower, D. (1955). Special nressage to the Congress reconlrlending a health

program. The Americun

Pra,yit{enc'1,

http //r,r"',vw.

c s b. ecl

:

p re

si

den

c

y

.

Lr

Projet'1. Retrieved

Jr-u-re

u/w s/in dex ph p?p i d: I 0 3 9
.

3,2010liom

I

Fallows, J. (1995, Janr-rary). The trir"rn-rph o1'misfbrtune. The Atluntic Monthllt s11/inc. Retrieved
December 4.2010 fiom http://www.theatlantic.corn/past/politicslhealthca/hctallow.htrn
Fortune Magazine. (2009). Fortune 500: Our top ranking of America's largest

corporations. Forlune Online. Retrieved

Jr-rne

3.2010 fiorn

http:/lmoney.cnn.com/magazines/tbrtune/fbrtune500

l2009lperfbrmers/industries/profits/

60

Fortrnier'. R.

&'fonrpson. f. (20tJ7). Voters say honestv. integritl'trurnp policies in

presider-rtial candidates. (1,\.4 7-oduv Onlinc. Retrieved May,25.2010

http://w'mv.usatoday.conr/neu,s/v'u'ashingtorr/2007-0i-

1

tiorl

l -candic'late-traits_N.htm

Gallrrp (2009). Americans creclit Obanra hipartisarr ef forts. Gulltrp Online. Retrieved
June 9.2010 f}om http://w.ww.gallup.cor-n/pollil23032lArlericans-Credit-ObanraB i parti san-

Gallr,rp

Eflbrts. aspx

(2010). Obama's leadership skills stancl out to Anrericans. Gullrrp Online.
Retrieved May 30, 2010 fi'orl http://www.gallr-rp.corl/poll/123104/obama-leadershipqual ities-stand-out-ameri can

s.

aspx

Gordon. C. (2003). Deud upon urrivul: The politic'.s o/ hcultlt t'ura

in ty,entieth-century

Atnaricu. Princeton, NJ: Princeton [-iniversitv I)ress.
Gorsk1,.

M. (2010). Good health lbr Anrerica. llistort' 7-rxlttl'. 60(2). Ipp ]. I{etrieved May 5.

201 0

tiom

http://www.l-ristorl,today'.cortr/MaipArticle.aspx'/ttt:331127&artricl:30301599
Greenstein. F. (200). The pre.sidenliul di/./'arcnt'c; lautlcrshist,vt-\'lc fi'ortt FDR to (.linton. New

York. NY: The Irree Press.
Hacker. J.S. (2009). Yes we can: The new pr,rsh lbr American health care. Politics und
Societlt, 37(1),3-32.
Hartman. M.. Martitt, A.. Nuccio. O..

& Catlin. A (2010). Ilealth

care spending at

historic low in 2008. Heulth A//hirs, 29(1). Retrieved May 25,2010 fiom
http:llcontent.healthaflairs.org/cgi/content/abstract
S

U LTF O RM

AT:&f

ul l te xt:n at i o n a l + h ea l t h +sps,-r

esourcetype:H WC IT

l?L)ll1147'Trnaxtoshow:&hits:10&RE
6 i ng

&

s

ea

rch

id

:

1

&

FIRS

T I NJ D EX

:0& r

6t

Flinklcr'. Il. (1990). 'l'hc

York. Itoutledge

s:1.,111holic

presitlctlcy; [1rrw pratittcttl.t ltortt'il.], thailtvcrlr'c.r. New

Press.

I-{oflllan" []. (2003). Health care refbrrl and social movements in the l-lrritec] States.
Antarit'un ,Jotrrrtul o/ I'tthlic Heullh, 93, 75-85.

'fhe Ilenrl'.f . Kaiser fiamily Foundation (2009). National health insurance. A briel
lristcrry'of'relbrtl efforts inthe U.S. Kuiser l;untily Foundulion. Retrievecl May 26.2010

fl'orl http://rv,,r,w.kfL.org/healthrefbrrn/7I7

I

.cfln

The IIenry'.1. Kaiser Family Iroundation (2010). LI.S. health care costs. Kui.ser Fumily,

lioundulion. Retrieved May 25,2010 fiom
h tt p

:

i/vr,'w w . kai sered u.

org/topics_im. asp?i mlD: l &parent l D:6 1 & i d:3

I-lvrrcs. (l()10. Novcnrher 12).

58

A Failureto communicate. The Ll'ushingtort'l'inta,t'onlinc.

Rctricvccl Decernber 4.2010 fiom
http://u'rvw.rvashingtontirnes.conr/news/20

1

0/nov/ 12la-t-allure-to-cilu-rn-rr,rnicate/

llulse. C.. Stolberg. S.. Zeleny.J.(2010. March 20). I-lealth vote

brink.

i\ict.r'

cerps

a.iournei'back

tl'or-n tlie

)'ork Time.t onlina. Retrieved Decerr-rber 5" 2010 tl'orr

lrttp://wr,r,w.nytimes.com/? 010103121/health/policyl2l reconstruct.htnrl'/pagew,anted: I &_r

:I&hp
IMS Health (2010. April 1). IMS Health reports lJ.S. prescription sales grew 5.1 percent

ir-r

2009 to $300.3 billion. IAIS Heulth. Retrieved Jr-ure 3. 2010 f}om

http://ww'w.imshealth.comlpofiallsite/imshealth/menuitern.a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f

6ll0l9419c?Zal?vgnextoid:d69}a27e9d5b72l0VgnVCMl00000edl52ca2RCRD&vgne
xtchannel:41a67900b 55a51 1 0VgnVCM 1 000007 1812ca2RCRD&vgnextfint:def-ault
IPSOS (2007. March I

l).

Honesty, integrity trump policies fbr people w,hen it conres to

(rl
presidential candiclates.
na. conr/new spo

II

1.P,\'(J^\'

onlina. ftetrier;ed May 25.2010 ti'orrr http://ww'w.i1,rsos-

s/pressre I ease. aspx'? i d:3 403

J.F.L. (1994). Howthe Clinton health proposal vvas corlceived and propagated. Pecliutric's-91(3).
384. Retrieved November 5. 2010 fl'on-r Acadenric Sezrrch Premier database.

Klein. R. (2003). Cornparative health care policy: Lessons fbr (and from) America.
Americun.lournul

o.f

Puhlic' IIeulth, 93(1 ). 6l-63.

Kouzes, J. & Posner. B. (2007). l-he leuclu"sltip chullergc. San Francisco. CA: JosseyBass.

Lee,C.E.(2010.April 1). PresidentOban,a: "lt'sonlybeenaweek." Politic'oonline. Retrieved
.lune B, 201 0

Lehrer,

.1.

fiom http://ww'w'.politico.corn/news/stories l04l0135305.html

(2009, .luly 20). Obama outlines expectations tbr health refbrrl tirneline. econortric

recovery. P/J^\'onlinc. Retrievecl .lune B.2010 tionr
http://ww'r,v.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec09/obarla_07-20.html
Liasson. M. (2007. Novenrber 7). I-lealth care initiativc a learning rrroment fbr Clintorr. lVtrtirtnul

Puhlic Rutlio onlinc. I{etrieved Noverntrer 13.2010 fiorn
htt p //www. npr. org/tem
:

p

I

atesistory/s tory. php?storyl

d:

I 608

B

95

I

Leonhardt. D. (2010. May 21). A progressive agendato remake Washington. l\ictr'\in'kTime.y.
Retrieved May 25,2010 li"om

http://www. nytimes.com/20 10105122/business/econom y l2Zleanhardt. htrnI
Lowes, R. (201 0, March 1 9). AMA sr-rpports latest healthcare refbrm legislation with
reservations. Medscupe ktday online. Retrieved July 20,2010 fiom
http : //www. m ed sc ape.

co

m/v i ewart icle I I I B 9 09

Mari, C. &. McCafliey, P.(2008). The reference she|': The Americun presidency. New

6i
York: The I I.W. Wilsorr Cornpany.
Martitr. and Snrith (2009. August 19).'l'cd Kc'nnecl1"s lcgacy shapes Obama's path. Politit'o

onlinc. Retricved .luly 20.
h tt p

:

//ww w. p o l i t i c o

.

co

201

0 liom

rn/n c u,s/s

t

orie

s/0 8 0 1) 1 2 6

11)

3_

Pa

ge 3 . h t rn

I

Navarro. V. (2007). Gettingthe tacts right: why Ilillary'carre lhiled. Physicians fbranational
health care program. ltetrievecJ Novenrber 13.2010 tl'orl
http //www. pnhp. org/ne w,s/2007 I nov cnr be r/gelt
:

i rr

g_t he_ f ac ts_ri.php

Neustadt. R.E.(1980). Pre.s'icluttiul p(..r''ar; T.hc politic'.t'r1f leudcrship fi'onr FDR to

Cortcr. New York: .lohn Wilev and Sons.
J

Northern Califbrnia Neurosllrger)' Meciical Group. Inc. (2009. November 10). The history of
health itrsurance in the [-lrrited States. ,\'ctn'o.sttt"git'ul onlina. Retrieved May 30.2010
fi'om http.//www.neLrrosr-rrgical.corl/nreclical_histor\,_iutd_cthics/history/history_ofhealth_i n sLlrance.

htrl

Obanra. B. (2008). Chunge wa L'un baliava

in. llurut'k Ohumu': plun trt raney,Americ'u's'

prontise. New York: I:ree Rivers Press.
Obarna. B. (2009. Irebruary

29).

Rerrtarks ot'Presiclent Ilarack Obama address to.foint session

Congress. White IIou,t'c onlinc. Retrievccl Ma),25.2010 tiont
http://www.whitehoLrse.gor,/tlrc_press_otlrce/renrarkr-of
ad d re

s s -t o -.i

o i n t - s e s s i o r-r - ct l-- C o n g re

s

-president-barack-obama-

s/

Overby, O, & Seabrook, A. (2009). l)rug f-rrnrs polrr $40 rnillion into health care debate.
J{cttionul Puhlic Rutlio onlinc. Retrieved Novenrber 13.2010 fiom
http://www.npr.org/ternpIates/story/story.
Pear, R.

php?storyI

d:

1

06

B

9 907

(l qqq. Architect of health plan could fhce charges. l/ev, |'ork

4

Times. Retrieved

of

6-1

Novenrber 1 3. 201 0 tl'onr http://r,r,,ww.nvtinres.contllL)L)4ll2l22luslarchitect-of'p I an -c o

Pear.

r,r I

d

-f ace-c harges. htnr I ?re

R (1991). Misconduct
13. 2010

:i

ra_c_nra gaz

i rr

er

Clinton health plan.,\'crr' l'orkTinrc,s'. Retrieved Novenrber

fiom http://www.nytimes.com/l994ll2l02luslrniscorrduct-firund-on-clirrton-

heaI th-p I an. html ?ref

Pelosi.

fbr-rnd on

f

health-

:i

ra_c_magazi ner

I\. (2010). Healthcare.

O/./ice

d

the Speukar Retrieved Novenrber

l3.2010li"orl

http ://www. speaker. gov/i ssues?i d:0 004

Pelosi. N. (2010, January 2B). If the gate is closed. we
l-righ, we

will pole vault in. O.//ice o.f.thc

http://www. speaker.gov/blog/?p:2

1

will

go over the f-ence.

Ilthe

f-ence is too

Speuket'. Retrier,'ed Decenrber 5.2010 fl"orl

38

IlBS.org (2001). Wilson - a portrait: election lL)12. I'trhlic lJroudcu.s'ting Sy.stcm online.
Retrieved Jr-rne 10. 2010 fionr
http //wwu'. pbs. org/wgbh/amex/wi
:

l

son/portrai t/wp_c

l

cc

t io n .h t

rn l

Rcinhardt. U.E. (2007). Is the president's plan deacl belbrc au'rival'l Briti.yh l+,lctlit'ul
,Journul,

33

1(7 587). 23B.

Rr-rdalevige, A. (2006). The contemporary presidency: 'l'he clecline ancl resurgence and

decline (and reslrrgence'/) of Congress. In C. Marri

&

P. McCafll'ey (Eds.).Tha re.fbrcnce

s'hcf: The American Presic{enr)/ (pp. 82-101). New'York: Tlre H.W. Wilson Company.
Santoro, G. (2010). Fred Greenstein. an expert on comparative styles of presidential leadership.

Americun History,4l(6), 14-15. Retrieved tiorrr Academic Search Premier database.
Srrrith, K. (1993). Health care retbrm deja vr-r. lrlursing Etorutrnics, I 1(6),376-318.
Starr, P.(1994). Whathappened to health care reforrn? The American Pro,spect (20) Retrieved
Decemb er 4, 20 1 0

fiom http://www.princeton.edu/*starr/20starr.htrnl

i

65

Steinhauser. P. (2009). Poll: Obanra's poplllarity grows as inauguration nei.lrs. ('AriV

onlinc. Itetricved .luly 19. 2010 l}om
http://u,ww.cnn.conl2009lPOLIl'lCS/01/18/poll.obama.rarting/index.htrrrl
Stevenson. R. (2005. Decenrber'21). Cheney says

L)lll

changed thc

rulcs.,\nr l"rtrk'l'ime.t'

online. ltetrieved Decerrrber 4. 2010 fiorn
http://w'ww.nytimes.com/2 0051 l2l20lworldlamericas/20iht-po lici,'. htnr l'l_r:
Trrrf-fer. C.. Keehan. S." Smith. S..Cylr.rs..l., Sisko. A.. Poisal".l.. Lit.onitz..l..

I

& Clerlens. K.

(2010). Health spending projections through 2019: The reccssion's inrpact continues.
Heulth A//uit'.s, 29(3).522-529. Retrieved May 25.2010 fl'onr
lrttp:/icontent.hearltlralfairs .orglcgilcontent/abstract/29131522'lnraxtoshorv-&hits: I 0&Rtr
SU

LTITORM

&reso

u rc ety--

AJ-:&tirl ltext:health+care+spending+2009&searrclr id: I & I" l R S'l- INID EX:0

pe: Il WC I -f

[-ll-rlrlan. M. (2007). Taming big governrnent. In C. Mari

&P. McCafll'ey (lrcls.). 7hr

rc/brent'a.thcl/: Thc Amcricutt ltre.rideni),(pp.70-81). Nen,Yorli: 'l'hc H.W'. W'ilson
Comptury.

ti.S.

C'ensns Bureau

(2010). 2010 Statistical Abstract of the United States.

(.,i.,S.

('(n.\'tt.\'

Bttreutt. I 29. Retrieved June 10. 2010 fiom
http://ww.uv.ce nsLrs.gov/compendia/statablcatslhealth_nr-rtrition.htrnI

U.S. Depzrrlment of Health and Human Services (2010). National health expenditures
2008 highlights. Center.s'./br Medicore trnt{ Medicaicl Service.s. Retrievecl May 25" 2010

fiom http://www'.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_Nationall lealthAccounts
Hi storical. asp#TopOfPage

Waterman, R., Wright, R.L.

& St. Clair, G.K. (1999). The imuge -

is

-

ever),thing

66

1trc.t'itlattct,: [)ilentntu.\ in ilntarit'un

The WIrite IIouse (2010). Ilealth care
I

lcutlcrship. Boulcler. CO: Westview

relblrl in action. WhiteHr)tt.\'e.Gov.

Press.

Retrievecl I'Jovcnrtrcr

3. 201 0 ti'onr http://wu,'u .rvhitehouse.gor,/healthrefbrrl/liealthcare-overvierv#hearlthcarr'-

nlenLt

Tlre White I-lor,rse (201 0). President .lirnnry Carter. WhiteHou,se.Gov. Retrieved November 7.
2010 fl'orrr http:i/www.whitehoLlse.gov/abor-rt/presidents/jirnrnycarter

Youngman, S. (2010). Obama brought cool carnpaign persona to healthcare battle's
tor-tghest

days. Thc Hill Online. Retrieved

JLrly 20^2010 fl'onr

http:/i thehill.cor-n/honrenew's/adrninistrationl895l5-obama-brought-cool-canrpaignpersona-to- heaI thcare-batt

I

e

Augsburg Coilege
Lindell Library
55454
MlnneaPolis, MN

